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ABSTRACT 
 
In the “institutional fragmentation of international IP law” debate, the analogy between international 
law and national legal systems, as the theoretical premise of the “institutional fragmentation” 
language, fails for the lack of “relevant similarity”. And secondly, the ontological “ethos” of 
international law, which are the inherent virtues of international law-making and implementation, 
regime evolution and interaction in this world society, could rectify the chaos of this rhetoric of 
“institutional fragmentation” and illuminate the understated benefits as well as rationalities of 
institutional fragmentation. The “post-ontological era” is not coming yet for this “institutional 
fragmentation” debate, and the “institutional fragmentation” is the “new normal”. Thirdly, The 
fundamental contradiction contained in this “institutional fragmentation of international law” debate 
is between the specialization of international law (the “functional approach” of modern international 
law’s development, as the endogenous factors) and top-down systematic theoretical conception of 
international law (international law as a legal system, as the exogenous factors). The junction of those 
forces is the “concerns on the legitimacy of international law” against national legal systems in a 
world society. Fourthly, from analogical reasoning to ontological “ethos”, there is a “paradigm shift” 
from the traditional “top-down” global governance paradigm (which is associated with analogical 
reasoning and hierarchical solutions to “regime complex”) to a “bottom-up” approach with more 
ontological and inside-out-looking (which could better grasp and understand the dynamics and pulse 
of regime interaction and evolution). This fundamental change enables those arguments thereafter on 
the regime interactions and evolutions have totally different theoretical departures, journeys and 
destinations. Namely, it is more appropriate to ask “what is the status quo, and how to understand it in 
a historical, relational, structural and holographic way; through analyses of underlying reasons and 
rules, how will the landscape develop in the future and what could or should be done if there are 
certain preferences” with a realistic “bottom-up approach” in consideration of the “law of universal 
gravitation” and the structure of “tensional integrity” in this “regime interaction” perspective, rather 
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than constructively and blindly ask “how to better manage the existing regimes and their collisions, 
and what are those workable (hierarchical or top-down-governance) solutions” from the perspective 
of “top-down” governance with cognitive path-dependence. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Conceptual analysis is an indispensable cornerstone of legal argumentation and academic debates. 
The substantive connotations of the concepts of “fragmentation” and “institutional fragmentation” has 
been obscure and ambiguous, which gap could be filled through conceptual analysis with a historical 
and ontological approach. This is a starting point to reflectively understand the current “institutional 
fragmentation” debate and rhetoric.  
  Chapter Ⅱ hereby continues, in the first place, with a methodological reflection on analogical 
reasoning so as to capture the origin and conceptual premises of the “institutional fragmentation” 
concept, and also with investigations on the historical evolution of those two concepts of 
“fragmentation” and “institutional fragmentation”.  
  Investigations on the connotations of the “fragmentation” concept in the existing literatures from 
three perspectives (from a descriptive perspective with regards to the healthy evolution of sub-fields 
of international law and co-existence of the treaties thereof, from a more interpretative and 
constructivist viewpoint derived from Niklas Luhmann’s notion of “functional differentiation”, from a 
more analytically and internally precise perspective of different phases of the international legal 
system) arrive at five preliminary conclusions. Firstly, the close analogy between international law 
and national legal systems is the theoretical precondition of this “fragmentation” debate in 
international law. Secondly, the intensification and aggravation of this fear of “fragmentation” arise 
from the explosive expansion and specialization of international law. The third noteworthy point is 
that this rhetoric of fragmentation seems to constantly emerge onto and along with arguments of 
various topics in the branches and subfields of international law, elusively and perpetually. The fourth 
preliminary concluding point is that there are disconnections and miscommunications between the 
overall theoretical researches in international law and specific question-oriented studies in sub-areas 
of international law, regarding this topic of institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law. 
Fifthly, modern international legal theories and academic researches in the twenty-first century, with 
the specific problem-oriented method, functional approach and pragmatism methodology, fault with 
traditional international legal theories, which leads to scorching arguments and dissensions on several 
significant and decisive topics (such as the “institutional fragmentation” of international law and the 
ontological “ethos” of international law herewith). 
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  Afterwards, when it comes to the “institutional fragmentation” of international law, historical 
investigations on the evolution of “institutional fragmentation” concept find that this concept of 
“institutional fragmentation”, as a sub-concept of “fragmentation” in international legal studies, is 
embodied with the same analogy between international law and national legal systems; and that this 
concept of “institutional fragmentation” stretched itself originally from the narratives about the 
proliferation of international (quasi-)judicial institutions all the way to today’s pivotal role in a more 
broad and controversial debate on international law-making, regimes’ evolutions, regime interactions, 
and international law’s texture and landscape. There are three reasons for this extension and stretch of 
the “institutional fragmentation” concept: the background (the dominance of the top-down-approach 
academic studies in the international law); concept’s good explanatory power (“institutional 
fragmentation” could illustrate the premier sources and the ultimate answers of those “chaos” in a 
world society); international regimes’ prosperity as international law-makers (international regimes 
have got legal authority and recognition as main contributors of international law-making). 
  In this world society, the limited role of international law and the actual logic of international 
law-making are quite unique, which should not be simply assimilated in the analogy with domestic 
legal theories and interpretations. Accordingly, this concept of “institutional fragmentation”, as 
originates from the analogy between international law and national legal systems, should be revisited 
and reflected in considerations of the ontological “ethos” of international law, so as to discover the 
core crux of this debate, as well as unearth the nature and essences of the “institutional fragmentation” 
of international law. 
  All the arguments and assertions above implicitly contain, greatly urge and require a delicate 
exposition on the ontological “ethos” of international (IP) law in this world society, since this 
ontological “ethos” has long been overlooked, downplayed, detached and ignored in the “institutional 
fragmentation” language of international (IP) law. For the “institutional fragmentation of international 
(IP) law” debate, the “post-ontological era” of mature and complex international (IP) law is not 
coming yet. 
  Firstly, on the level of the application, interpretation and implementation of international law，
international law is “case-based applied”, “auto-interpreted” and “disguised implemented”. Secondly, 
on the level of the establishment, interaction and evolution of international regimes and legal rules, 
historically, pluralistically and functionally speaking, international (IP) law is accretive, accumulative 
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and progressive. Thirdly, comparatively and constructively from the perspective of the nature and 
legitimation of international legal system, international law is realistic and conservative, or even 
labeled as primitive.  
  Specifically to the topic of “institutional fragmentation of international IP law” here in the thesis, 
firstly, diversity and pluralism is the existential condition of international legal system in this world 
society. That requires international law to be more responsive and functional, and the coherence and 
unity is less valued and is not going to be valued in the same way as in national legal systems. 
Secondly, against this decentralized and realistic backdrop of world society, analogy between 
international legal system and national legal systems is untenable. Thirdly, pluralism and complexity 
reflects the complex interest appeals in this world society, and the benefits of “institutional 
fragmentation”, making international law being effective and relevant, are understated and 
misinterpreted. Fourthly, bottom-up approach can be more explanatory and effective in the analyses 
of regime interaction and evolution, as it is more ontological and inside-out-looking to grasp and 
understand the dynamics and pulse of regime interaction and evolution.  
  The argumentation highlights to deconstruct this rhetoric of “institutional fragmentation” of 
international law in this thesis are as follows: (1) the analogy between international law and national 
legal systems, as the theoretical premise of the “institutional fragmentation” language, fails for the 
lack of “relevant similarity”. (2) The ontological “ethos” of international (IP) law, which are the 
inherent virtues of international law-making and implementation, regime evolution and interaction in 
this world society, could rectify the chaos of this rhetoric of “institutional fragmentation” and 
illuminate the understated benefits as well as rationalities of institutional fragmentation. (3) The 
fundamental contradiction in this debate is between the specialization of international law and 
top-down systematic theoretical conception of international law. (4) From analogical reasoning to 
ontological “ethos”, there is a “paradigm shift” from the traditional “top-down” global governance 
paradigm to a “bottom-up” approach with more ontological and inside-out-looking. 
  Regarding the benefits and rationalities of “institutional fragmentation”, Firstly, the so-called 
“institutional fragmentation” achieves the market-oriented competition and allocation of international 
regimes and institutions. Secondly, the so-called “institutional fragmentation” endows the subjects of 
international law (particularly the States) with more options and bargain chips in the negotiations and 
conclusion of international legal documents. Thirdly, the so-called “institutional fragmentation” 
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requires that those international legal practices should pay more attention to the legitimacy of the 
regime/institution as an authority in this world society, as well as should be more closely and tightly 
linked to the latest dynamics and landscapes of this world society. 
  It is clear that the huge gap between academic research and practical, as well as “huge gap between 
normative level and implementation” in international law, has caused a lot of confusions and chaos on 
legal rhetoric and interpretation. And this debate of “institutional fragmentation”, as “a powerful and 
defining metaphor of modern international law scholarship”, is one of those. To sum up, the 
fundamental contradiction contained in this “institutional fragmentation of international law” debate 
is between the specialization of international law (the “functional approach” of modern international 
law’s development, as the endogenous factors) and top-down systematic theoretical conception of 
international law (international law as a legal system, as the exogenous factors). And the junction of 
those forces is the “concerns on the legitimacy of international law” as a legal system in a world 
society. 
  This chapter concludes that it is clear that this is a good opportunity to theorize and internalize the 
“institutional fragmentation” debate into the ontological “ethos” of international law, with “a 
reconceptualization of both the functions and the effectiveness of modern international law and 
institutions” so as to better understand international law as a legal system in a world society. It is 
obvious that this topic of “institutional fragmentation” could be an excellent pointcut to realize the 
“paradigm shift” and get rid of the “top-down approach dependence” in international legal studies. 
And this ontological “ethos” perspective of international law guarantees a high-definition display of 
international IP regime interactions and evolution. 
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“When one starts to deal with an international legal problem, say a dispute about the rights 
of States, one very soon enters certain controlling assumptions which seems to demand 
solution before the problem can even be approached in some determinate way and a legal 
solution be suggested.” 
 
From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument.  
Koskenniemi, Martti. 1989 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conceptual analysis is one of the most vital components of legal reasoning and academic arguments, 
and is also considered as the touchstone of a successful theoretical presentation of a social phenomenon 
in high definition.1  On the one hand, from the perspective of traditional “black letter” legal studies, 
conceptual analysis is one of the most effective and appropriate methods to start an argument and settle 
a controversy. That’s, firstly, because a clear composition of the core concepts’ definitions as well as 
connotations is the origin, cradle and carrier of subsequent descriptive panoramas, analytical pillars and 
conceptual framework constructions, 2  in terms of the methodologies of legal researches; 3  and 
secondly, in terms of rational cognition, because a clear, thorough and rational conceptual analysis, 
necessarily but not sufficiently, guarantees and demonstrates rationalities onto the disenchantment and 
                                                            
1 See Jackson, Frank. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998. (Jackson claims that conceptual analysis plays an essential role in all rational inquiry.) See Plunkett, David. 
Expressivism, Representation, and the Nature of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Studies 156.1 (2011): 15-31. 
(“One of the standard projects that philosophers claim to engage in is the project of conceptual analysis. In broad 
terms, we might say that this is the project of better understanding the content or meaning of concepts that we use 
in thought and practice—e.g., free will, belief, or law.”) As for critics of Jackson, see Laurence, Stephen, and Eric 
Margolis. Concepts and Conceptual Analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67.2 (2003): 253-282. 
Regarding applications of conceptual analysis in specific fields, see Victora, Cesar G., et al. The Role of 
Conceptual Frameworks in Epidemiological Analysis: A Hierarchical Approach. International Journal of 
Epidemiology 26 (1997): 224-227, 227. (“Conceptual hierarchical frameworks” are used for many studies, 
including childhood infectious disease, malnutrition, low birthweight, infant mortality, hypertension and obesity.) 
2 Vygotskiĭ, L. S., and Alex Kozulin. Thought and Language. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986, p 132-134. Also 
see Keil, Frank C. Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992, p 6. (“More 
often than not, new phenomena and objects are named after inessential attributes, so that the name does not truly 
express the nature of the thing named…the result is a ceaseless struggle within the developing language between 
conceptual thought and the heritage of primitive thinking in complexes.”) 
3 See Machery, Edouard. Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science 72.3 (2005): 444-467. (“In 
cognitive science, concepts are the bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and are used by 
default in the higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, analogy making, 
language understanding, etc.).”) 
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cognitive processes in the form of logical reasoning,4 which is more than likely to disambiguate the 
pre-existing fallacies and cut off the “poisonous tree” where “poisonous fruits” grow.5 
  On the other hand, from the perspective of socio-legal study in the “context”, revisiting to basic 
concepts could reveal those underexplored realms and underexposed spectrums that is inadvertently 
sealed or ignored, and thus prop up a fresh architecture of arguments.6 It could be deep downwards 
contextualized in the latest empirical contexts, and high upwards abstracted to top-down regulatory 
legal setup.7 Moreover, in terms of the persuasiveness and explanatory power in respects to the 
concept of “fragmentation” in this debate, “rethinking the conceptually useful yet functionally artificial 
analysis”,8 if it could be considered as that, would better reflect the complex realities and development 
of international law under this “world society”.9 
  Therefore, regarding this study on the institutional fragmentation of international IP law henceforth, 
we should firstly have a clear understanding about the two concepts of “fragmentation” and 
“institutional fragmentation”, both historically and reflectively, under the context of the concurrent 
development of international legal system in this “world society”. Only after all those clarifications 
could we have the methodological confidence and necessary theoretical foundations to start the 
expedition to the institutional fragmentation of international IP law comprehensively in the subsequent 
                                                            
4 Masalova, Svetlana. Cognitive Rationality and Its Logic-Mathematical Language. Psychology Research, 2.12 
(2012): 744-751. (“Structural basis of the cognitive (flexible) rationality is a concept—a form of the inseparability 
of the rational and irrational cognition.”) Also see Kant, Immanuel, Marcus Weigelt, and F. Max Müller. Critique 
of pure reason. London: Penguin, 2007. 
5 See Jackson, Frank. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998. p 28-55. (Frank Jackson places the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry, and 
argues that conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, preventing a whole range of 
important questions from being productively addressed. “[C]onceptual analysis is the very business of addressing 
when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental 
vocabulary. When Roderick Chisholm and A. J. Ayer analysed knowledge as true justified belief, they were 
offering an account of what makes an account of how things are told using the word ‘knowledge’ true in terms of 
an account using the terms ‘true’, ‘justified’, and ‘belief’. It counted as a piece of conceptual analysis because it 
was intended to survive the method of possible cases.”) Also see Larkins, Christopher M. Judicial Independence 
and Democratiziation: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis. Am. J. Comp. L. 44 (1996): 605. 
6 For example, see Griffiths, John. What is Legal Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 
18.24 (1986): 1-55. Also see Himma, Kenneth Einar. Do Philosophy and Sociology Mix? A Non-Essentialist 
Socio-Legal Positivist Analysis of the Concept of Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24.4 (2004): 717-738. 
(Criticizing the “socio-legal positivism” with respects to the concept of law.) 
7 As for other literatures on the top-down and bottom-up approaches, see Sabatier, Paul A. Top-down and 
Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis. Journal of 
Public Policy (1986): 21-48. 
8 See Puig, Sergio. International Regime Complexity and Economic Law Enforcement. Journal of International 
Economic Law (2014): 1–26, 3. (The article tries to “encourage rethinking the conceptually useful yet functionally 
artificial analysis of international trade and investment law as discrete, separate systems”.) 
9 It is true for many concepts in international law, as the “evolutionary process” is unceasing. For example, see 
Alex Mills. Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 84.1 (2014): 
187-239. 
3 
sections and next several chapters.10 
  Specifically speaking to the topic hereof, fragmentation is certainly not a new but still quite 
controversial as well as decisive issue, either when Judge Gilbert Guillaume, as the President of the 
International Court of Justice, was addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations and giving a 
warn about the fragmentation’s potential damages to international legal order on 27 October 2000,11 or 
when Hersch Lauterpacht was defending the “reality of the law of nations” before the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Chatham House, in 1941.12  
“The disunity of the modern world is a fact; but so, in a truer sense, is its unity. Th[e] 
essential and manifold solidarity, coupled with the necessity of securing the rule of law and 
the elimination of war, constitutes a harmony of interests which has a basis more real and 
tangible than the illusions of the sentimentalist or the hypocrisy of those satisfied with the 
existing status quo. The ultimate harmony of interests which within the State finds expression 
in the elimination of private violence is not a misleading invention of nineteenth century 
liberalism.”13 
  And always, the fragmentation debate is deeply tangled with the “semantics of unity and diversity”14 
of international law as a legal system, the construction of the international legal order as a conceptual 
invention, 15  and the concerns over international law’s texture, configuration as well as future 
                                                            
10 Contextualizing the fragmentation debate in specific historical backgrounds would greatly complement the 
analytical or the structural approach and thus shed light on the politics of fragmentation and what we are really 
arguing about. See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International 
Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 1-4. 
11 See Gilbert Guillaume. The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International 
Legal Order. Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, to 
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 October 2000. Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1. (“In effect, they not only create a choice 
of courts - not to say a market - for the parties concerned, but they also increase the risk of conflicting judgments.”) 
See Guillaume, Gilbert. The Future of International Judicial Institutions. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 44.04 (1995): 848-862. Also see Aspremont, Jean d'. Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A 
Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p 205.  
12 See Koskenniemi, Martti. Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law. Eur. J. Int'l L. 8 (1997): 
215, 220-221, 262. (“Lauterpacht’s main theoretical work. The Function of Law in the International Community 
(1933), set up the doctrine of a comprehensive international legal order to defend in legal terms the unity of a 
world that seemed to be heading from fragmentation to catastrophe, from the League of Nations to the Holocaust. 
It was compatible with the ideas of the nineteenth century Jewish enlightenment and prevailing pacifist sentiments. 
It also helped Lauterpacht to assimilate within a cosmopolitan elite that constructed its identity from rationalist, 
anti-nationalist sentiments and an individualist cultural outlook.”) 
13 See H. Lauterpacht. The Reality of the Law of Nations. In Lauterpacht, Elihu. International Law, Being the 
Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht. Systematically Arranged and Edited by E. Lauterpacht. Cambridge [Eng.]: 
University Press, 1970, p 26. 
14 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28. 
15 See Schermers, Henry G., and Niels M. Blokker. International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p 723. (“Whenever there is a law-maker there is a legal order. Each state has its 
own legal order, composed of the totality of legal rules regulating the national community. At the global level, the 
4 
evolution,16 arising originally from the ontological “ethos” of international law and international law’s 
analogy with national legal systems.17 All those hang there just like some sort of “Sword of Damocles”, 
reemerging from time to time to stir the studies on international law and sub-areas.18 By drawing on 
the current debate about fragmentation in international law, reflections and reconstructions are still in 
their infancy; and meanwhile, noises and controversies continue to rise one after another. 
  However, amid all those literatures, it seems to be that few articles seem to be concerned about the 
accurate connotations of the concept of “(institutional) fragmentation” or prepare to offer a precise 
definition wherein, 19  so as to better architect the intellectual edifice of international law’s 
fragmentation debate.20 It is quite likely that the academia tends to take this concept for granted due to 
its descriptive representation and historical complexity, but the consequential damages accordingly to 
the fragmentation debate in international law cannot be emphasized too much.21 The evolution, 
referents and the connotations of this concept of “fragmentation”, both linguistically and conceptually, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
law-maker is still underdeveloped, international law being made principally by states. Global law-making is not 
centralized, in contrast to law-making at the national level, and consequently international law lacks the unity that 
characterized domestic legal order exists at all. An affirmative answer is given by some writers, while a negative 
answer is given by others, depending on the criteria used for the definition of a legal order.”)  
16 For example, see Taylor, Allyn L. Global Governance, International Health Law and WHO: Looking towards 
the Future. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 80.12 (2002): 975-980. (Arguing about the coordination, 
coherence and implementation of international health law policy under the context of globalization, by examining 
the forces and factors behind the emerging expansion of conventional international health law.) Actually, the issue 
of “the evolution of international law” has been explored from various perspectives and connected to many issues 
of international legal order in a world society. For example, see Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. Downs. National 
Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law. European Journal of International Law 20.1 
(2009): 59-72. 
17 More clearly and specifically speaking, this debate is not about fragmentation. Rather it is about how to 
conceive and understand international law as a unique legal system, or the so-called “international legal order”. 
See Prost, Mario. All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law’s Unities and the Politics of Fragmentation. 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 17 (2006): 1-29, 1. (“It is concerned with the mainstream discourse on 
unity/fragmentation and what that discourse reveals about the way international lawyers conceive of 'their' law 
(and of their role in it).”)  
18 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 4. (“Understood as such, the notion of fragmentation has 
appeared in the international legal discourse at regular intervals since the mid-nineteenth century. Although its 
connotation has certainly changed over time…, its denotation has remained the same: to invoke fragmentation is to 
evoke an image of chaos, explosion.”) 
19 See Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 13. (“In 
fact, most discussions about unity/fragmentation provide no definition at all. Often, unity and fragmentation are 
simply presented as opposite theoretical positions. But their meaning remains rather vague and intuitive.”) 
20 For example, “[t]his approach is not free of ambiguity. The Commission recognized and defined self-contained 
regimes as a subcategory (namely a “strong form”) of lex specialis within the law of State responsibility. As such, 
it appears to cover the case where a special set of secondary rules claims priority over the secondary rules in the 
general law of State responsibility.” “The judgment by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the S.S. 
Wimbledon case, however, uses a broader notion of a self-contained regime.” See ILC. Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the 
Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 
April 2006), p 66, par. 124, 126. 
21 See von Benda-Beckmann, Franz. Who's Afraid of Legal Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 34.47 (2002): 37-82, 37. (“Rather than looking at the heuristic value of the concept for describing 
and analysing complex empirical situations, the conceptual struggles seem to create two camps, effacing the many 
differences in assumptions and approaches to law in society that can be found within both these camps.”) 
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somehow are downplayed. As such, this language of fragmentation becomes ambiguous and somewhat 
unintelligible.22 If we are not able to abort the chaos and clarify the concept of fragmentation in the 
first place, it is far from possible to expect a debate with rationality and a language of fragmentation 
embodying rigorous legal reasoning. And that’s why, right now in the language of fragmentation, we 
are sometimes confronted with endless but pointless or even clueless contests. And what’s worse, 
substantially misleading but seemingly plausible arguments, such as the semantic dimensions in regard 
to the designatum of “self-contained regime”23 and “the unity of international legal order”,24 are still 
reverberating. And many associated concepts alike have been in dark for way too long. For instance, 
regarding the notion of “self-contained regime”, although the International Law Commission endeavors 
to synthesize various definitions of the notion of “self-contained regime” in different senses, none of 
them is “clear or straightforward”25; and underlying theoretical origins of the alternative concept—
“special” regimes—have been inadequately probed. In the case of the unity of international legal order, 
argumentations about international legal pluralism and international regimes’ interaction seem to be 
chaotic and disordered.26 
                                                            
22 For example, see Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International 
Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 8-9. (“[I]t is precisely because international lawyers 
view international law as leading from political chaos to legal unity while refusing to engage in discussing the 
substance of that unity (and the extent to which it includes diversity), that they have had recourse to the language 
of fragmentation as a discursive tool for contestation and criticism.” “Nevertheless, what links the various 
moments together is the relatively stylized ways in which the word ‘fragmentation’ is invoked, either as the 
prologue to unity or as a menace to unity.”) 
23 See Dupuy, Pierre-Marie. A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of International 
Law. Eur. J. Legal Stud. 1 (2007): 1. (“However, none of the theoretical justifications advanced by those who 
identify special regimes wherever it suits them stand up to analysis. Even when a sub-system of law is original in 
terms of its secondary norms of recognition, enactment and adjudication, to use the terminology of H.L.A. Hart, it 
does not necessarily become cut off from the body of governing principles.”) See Simma, Bruno, and Dirk 
Pulkowski. Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law. European Journal of 
International Law 17.3 (2006): 483-529. (The authors argue that “‘conceptual’ arguments for so-called 
self-contained regimes are unconvincing”, and propose a fallback on general international law.) Also see Simma, 
Bruno. Self-contained Regimes. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 16 (1985): 111-136.  
24 See Burke-White, William. International Legal Pluralism. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 963. (It argues that the 
international law is being transformed into a pluralist system rather than the so-called fragmentation, and this 
international legal pluralism strengthens the international legal order.) Marschik, Axel. Too Much Order? The 
Impact of Special Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy of the International Legal System. European 
Journal of International Law 9.1 (1998): 212-239, 213. (“Using the term 'subsystem', as defined above, it is 
possible to rephrase the main question of the book: Is the existence of diverse subsystems a threat to the unity and 
efficacy of the international system?”) 
25  ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 70, par. 133-135. (“None of this is to say that the effect 
of a self-contained regime in this third sense would be clear or straightforward.” “The three notions of 
‘self-contained regime’ are not clearly distinguished from each other.”) 
26 See Mosler, Hermann. The International Society as a Legal Community. Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, p 191, 203. (“States have their own exclusive domestic sphere which is protected by 
international law, while the legal order of international organizations is created by the constituent members and is 
therefore not so complete. It is, in fact, limited to the exercise of the functions entrusted to the organizations by its 
constituent treaty”. As for the legal nature of the internal law, “the question has been raised as to whether the 
internal legal order of international organizations is part of international law or whether it forms a separate legal 
6 
“Regardless of the conclusion that is reached regarding the existence of an international 
legal order, there is general agreement that international law lacks the coherence of national 
law. This lack of unity is to some extent compensated for by international organizations, each 
of which has a legal order of its own. This legal order is not similar to domestic legal orders. 
It is partial and functional legal order, because it is limited to the field of operation of the 
organization and to those states that participate in it. Within the limits of their competence, 
international organizations are used by the member states as framework for law-making. In 
addition, these organizations may also be involved in the supervision of the rules in question. 
In this way, international organizations provide some unity, some coherence in the 
international legal order.”27 
Here, the thesis is not saying that offering a clear definition is the only priority or a must-do, nor is it 
asserting that this revisiting would guarantee to disambiguate all the controversies, disenchant 
projected structures and cure all those “diseases”. Obviously, whatever conceptual, methodological and 
theoretical approaches we may use, the reach and accomplish would still be limited in many senses, not 
to mention that it is almost impossible to arrive at a definition of “fragmentation” and associated 
notions that everyone agrees with.28 Different literatures are engaged in different discourses and 
situations in multiple-dimensional level of discussions.29 Rather, it is proposed here and pushed 
forward as a starting point to ask: what kind of implications could be spelled out from this situation 
where the researchers in the academia conceive and continually shape the debate on (institutional) 
fragmentation of international law stuck in the status quo? Why and how is this “hybrid fusion”30 
maintained all the way up to now? What could be deduced from the status quo mentioned above in 
respects to this debate, language, rhetoric and politics of international law’s (institutional) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
order analogous to the legal systems of states.”) Also see Schermers, Henry G., and Niels M. Blokker. 
International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p 724. (“There is more 
difference of opinion as to whether the legal orders of international organizations are also separate from the 
international legal order.”) 
27 See Schermers, Henry G., and Niels M. Blokker. International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p 723-724. 
28  For similar arguments about legal pluralism, see von Benda-Beckmann, Franz. Who's Afraid of Legal 
Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 34.47 (2002): 37-82, 39. (“While our conceptual 
choices concerning law and legal pluralism are based on a number of methodological and theoretical assumptions, 
these must be supplemented by a more encompassing social theoretical understanding of the social world. The 
concepts of ‘law’ or ‘legal pluralism’ are only a part of our wider conceptual and analytical tools.”) 
29 See von Benda-Beckmann, Franz. Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 34.47 (2002): 37-82, 41. 
30 See Geertz, Clifford. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books, 
1983, p 232. 
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fragmentation? As a conceptually useful metaphor of this world society and international law therein, 
this debate of (institutional) fragmentation could surely reveal deeper insights concerning international 
law’s “ethos” and its further (institutional) development under the background of a world society.  
  Therefore, as the necessity, reasonability, feasibility and significance of this analytical approach – 
“conceptual analysis” – are quite good for the study hereof on the institutional fragmentation of 
international (IP) law in a world society, the following are: firstly, a historically comprehensive 
revisiting of those two concepts of “fragmentation” and “institutional fragmentation” with the 
conceptual analysis method, by rethinking those concepts in contextualized international scenes and 
from the perspective of evolutionary processes; secondly, some further narratives on the “ethos” of 
international law and rhetoric of “institutional fragmentation”; thirdly and lastly, some concluding 
remarks about this perspective of ontological “ethos” and institutional fragmentation in international 
(IP) law. 
 
  
8 
2.2 A METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON ANALOGICAL REASONING 
 
It is always more than necessary and helpful to make a preliminary methodological rethinking amid a 
mass of literatures on an issue,31 so as to get a more accurate and keen grasp of what is essentially 
referred and argued in the name of this issue or concept. That’s particularly true in the case of this 
(institutional) fragmentation debate that is used as a metaphor in the development of international law 
and hereof is reassessed as well as reanalyzed from a more empirical and ontological perspective.32 
  As no stranger to jurisprudence scholars, analogical reasoning is widely used in legal reasoning,33 
especially in common law system, and it is even recognized as the cornerstone and hallmark of 
common law reasoning.34 But the persuasiveness and validity of different categories of analogies in 
legal arguments depend on “the cogency of the reasoning” in specific cases,35 namely, whether certain 
analogy can provide analytically appropriate as well as explanatorily valuable interpretations and 
solutions that are consistent with legal principles and rationale in that specific field.36 Those legal 
principles, rationale or “inter-doctrinal coherence”37 originate from the realities and contexts where 
analogy is tentatively constructed and entrusted to resolve disputes about diverse and plural interests.38 
                                                            
31 For example, see Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. 
& Pol. 31 (1998): 919. 
32 See Kennedy, David. International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion. Nordic Journal of 
International Law 65.3 (1996): 387. (A more “sophisticated, functional and pragmatic” perspective towards 
modern international law should be adopted, compared to the philosophy of international law in the nineteenth 
century.) 
33 Generally, see Levi, Edward H. An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1949. (For example, “It is Levi’s view that analogical reasoning is the principle method by which lawyers argue 
their cases, and reasoning by analogy is thus, for him, the primary window into law’s manipulability.”) 
34 Weinreb, Lloyd L. Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument. Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 
1-5. Also see Grant Lamond. Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, 
No. 3 (2014), 567-588, 587. (“Close analogies, for example, are a cornerstone of common law reasoning, since 
close analogies complement and expand a narrow conception of the nature of precedent.”) 
35 See Grant Lamond. Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 
3 (2014), 567-588, 587. (“What matters far more is the cogency of the reasoning in the analogical case, i.e., 
whether it presents a good case for dealing with an issue in a certain way.”) 
36 See Grant Lamond. Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 
3 (2014), 567-588, 588. (“All forms of analogical reasoning draw on the fact that legal doctrines are not simply a 
body of standards with a particular structure, but a body of standards with an intelligible rationale that are nested 
within wider bodies of law.”) 
37 See Grant Lamond. Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 
3 (2014), 567-588, 588. 
38 See Sunstein, Cass R. On Analogical Reasoning. Harvard Law Review (1993): 741-791. 746. (“In law, 
analogical reasoning has four different but overlapping features: principled consistency; a focus on particulars; 
incompletely theorized judgments; and principles operating at a low or intermediate level of abstraction. Taken in 
concert, these features produce both the virtues and the vices of analogical reasoning in law.”) Weinreb, Lloyd L. 
Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 29-30. 
(Sunstein commends analogical legal reasoning as a means of resolving disputes when there is not agreement 
about underlying principles. Lawyers and judges resort to analogical reasoning when they lack a “comprehensive 
theory that would account for the particular outcomes [analogical reasoning] yields.”) Also see Sunstein, Cass R. 
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p 68. 
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That means analogical reasoning should be both faithful to the former doctrines and sensitive to the 
latter new situations, two items—source and target—being compared, which then is able to link and 
transfer legal thoughts progressively and accurately.39 Otherwise, the method is just window-dressing 
and deductively invalid.40  
  And the heart of this method of analogical reasoning, with respects to its deductive validity and 
logical rationality force, essentially lies in the “relevant similarity”41, which means that we have to 
know that A and B are “relevantly” similar, and that there are not “relevant” differences between 
them.42 That notion of “relevance”, however, is “tenaciously resistant to conceptual explication” and 
makes analogy “largely mysterious and unanalyzed”.43 Analogical legal reasoning is thus considered 
to be “logically flawed”44, as it cannot proceed on its own without “identification of a governing 
ides…to account for the results in the source and target cases”45.46 That’s also why many scholars 
assert that analogical legal reasoning is a “fantasy”.47 
“The heart of the matter, Brewer asserts, and the reason why analogies are so hard to tame, 
is the requirement of relevant similarity. All accounts of analogical argument agree that an 
analogy is successful and justifies its conclusion only if the observed similarity between the 
                                                            
39 See Grant Lamond. Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 
3 (2014), 567-588, 588. (“Its importance lies in the way that it serves the courts’ adjudicative functions: it enables 
courts to develop the law in ways that are both faithful to existing legal doctrine and sensitive to the novel context 
in which the law is to be applied.”) 
40 See Teitelbaum, Joshua C. Analogical Legal Reasoning: Theory and Evidence. American Law and Economics 
Review, V0 N0 (2014), 1–32, 2. (Stating that “it suffers from theoretical and empirical indeterminacy”)  
41 See Brewer, Scott. Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by 
Analogy. Harvard Law Review (1996): 923-1028, 933. Also see Weinreb, Lloyd L. Legal Reason: The Use of 
Analogy in Legal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 33. (“So, one might say, a source 
and target are relevantly similar and the analogy is successful if there are relevantly similar and the analogy is 
successful if there are reasons to conclude that the characteristics that are observed to be similar are regularly 
accompanied by the characteristic that is in doubt. ”) 
42 See Sunstein, Cass R. On Analogical Reasoning. Harvard Law Review (1993): 741-791. 745. 
43 See Brewer, Scott. Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by 
Analogy. Harvard Law Review (1996): 923-1028, 933. 
44 See Weinreb, Lloyd L. Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p 31. Also see Sunstein, Cass R. On Analogical Reasoning. Harvard Law Review (1993): 
741-791. 744. (“At most, analogical thinking can give rise to a judgment about probabilities, and often these are of 
uncertain magnitude.”) 
45 See Sunstein, Cass R. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p 65. 
46 Weinreb, Lloyd L. Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p 31. (“For Levi acknowledges explicitly that analogical reasoning is logically flawed, and Sunstein, 
in effect, does as well. Extolling the virtues of incompletely theorized agreements reached on the basis of an 
analogy, Sunstein says in an aside: ‘To be sure, analogical reasoning cannot proceed without identification of a 
governing ides…to account for the results in the source and target cases.’ The analogy is important nevertheless, 
he says, because it ‘helps identify the governing idea.’ That, however, has no more to do with the validity of the 
argument than Brewer’s abductive step does. From a logical point of view, the crux of the matter is that analogical 
reasoning ‘cannot proceed’ on its own.”) 
47 See Brewer, Scott. Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by 
Analogy. Harvard Law Review (1996): 923-1028. Also see Sunstein, Cass R. On Analogical Reasoning. Harvard 
Law Review (1993): 741-791. See Sunstein, Cass R. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996. 
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source and the target is relevant to the further similarity that is in question.”48 
And the concept of “fragmentation” originally arises from the analogy between international legal 
system and national legal system.49 This language of fragmentation lastingly continues and emerges at 
intervals, with basic theoretical foundations unchanged and discussion emphasis as well as objectives 
ever-changing.50 Those theoretical premises include one significant and central argumentation point: 
international law is a legal system whose texture and structure should be the same, or at least mostly 
similar, with national legal systems within states.51  
  Undoubtedly, international law is a legal system,52 whether it is defined as a decentralized one, a 
horizontal one, or a legal system with other special ethos, by nature or its functions.53 And through the 
ages, it used to be conceptually and theoretically assumed as an international legal system that is, or 
ought to be, similar to national legal systems to some extent under a traditional systematic vision of 
international law,54 such as the unity and a coherent legal order of international law. But no matter how 
scholars respond to the fragmentation debate with criticism or welcome,55 empirically speaking, it is 
                                                            
48 Weinreb, Lloyd L. Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p 32. (Words in bold are originally highlighted in italics in Weinreb’s book) 
49 This kind of analogy can be found in many fields of international law. For example, see Lauterpacht, H. First 
Report on the Law of Treaties. United Nations document, A/CN 4.63 (1953), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1953 vol. II, p 156-159. (Analogy between international tribunals and domestic courts) Also see 
Jenks, C. Wilfred. The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties. Brit. YB Int'l L. 30 (1953): 401, 403. (“In the absence of 
a world legislature with a general mandate, law-making treaties are tending to develop in a number of historical, 
functional and regional groups which are separate from each other and whose mutual relationships are in some 
respects analogous to those of separate systems of municipal law.”) 
50 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28. 
51 See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999. 1002. (“By this token, they identify a danger to the 
unity of international law because the conceptual-doctrinal consistency, the clear hierarchy of norms and the 
effective judicial hierarchy that was developed within the nation-states, is lacking. Accordingly, they direct 
themselves to a hierarchical solution to the problem, which, whilst not wholly reproducing the ideal of legal 
hierarchies of the nation-state, at least comes somewhere close to it. …”) 
52 See Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 2006. Adopted by the International Law Commission 
at its Fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report 
covering the work of that session (A/61/10, par. 251). The report will appear in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two. (“International law as a legal system. International law is a legal system. Its 
rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other 
rules and principles. As a legal system, international law is not a random collection of such norms. There are 
meaningful relationships between them. Norms may thus exist at higher and lower hierarchical levels, their 
formulation may involve greater or lesser generality and specificity and their validity may date back to earlier or 
later moments in time.”) 
53 For example, as for the special characteristics of international law as a decentralized legal system, see 
Malanczuk, Peter, and Michael Barton Akehurst. Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law. London: 
Routledge, 2002, p 1-9. See Koh, Harold Hongju. How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?. Indiana 
Law Journal 74.4 (1999): 1397-1417. (The conventional “horizontal” story about international human rights law 
enforcement) 
54  See Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of 
International Law 50 (2008): 393-405. 
55 Some literatures assert that this fragmentation phenomenon is a “strategic choice” or “multiple forum capture” 
to preserve dominance. See Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs. The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
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more about conceptual understandings of international law as a legal system, rather than “a true 
reflection of political, economic, and social realities” in the international community,56 at least from 
the perspective of the narrative and rhetoric of international law and international politics in a world 
society.  
“The international legal system has never enjoyed the kind of coherence that may have 
characterized the legal orders of States……International law will need to operate within an 
area where the demands of coherence and reasonable pluralism will point in different 
directions.”57 
For example, Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. Downs believe that the fragmentation of international 
law “represents an ongoing effort on the part of powerful states to preserve their dominance in an era in 
which hierarchy is increasingly viewed as illegitimate, and to reduce their accountability both 
domestically and internationally”.58 Apparently, the prerequisite of this argument is that theoretical 
“quality and justice” is the normal value, or at least should be the normal value, of international law in 
today’s world society, while the realities of international law and international politics are ignored 
either consciously or accidentally.59 Namely, this argument starts not from an empirical observation 
and analysis of international society, but from a somehow conceptually constructed “good and efficient” 
conception of the international legal order or international legal system, which tends to be at the first 
place more legally principled rather than empirically pragmatic.60 Those issues are no stranger to 
international lawyers, who must continually juggle the distance between “ought” and “is”, law and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law. Stanford Law Review (2007): 595-631. About the fear of 
“multiple forum capture”, which means that developed countries “bring the TRIPs-plus agenda simultaneously and 
coordinately at various forums, including by establishing initiatives in forums that lie outside the regular 
multilateral institutional framework for intellectual property norm-setting”, see Viviana Muñoz Tellez. The 
Changing Global Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement: A New Challenge for Developing Countries. 
In Li Xuan and Carlos Correa (eds.), Intellectual Property Enforcement: International Perspectives. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2009, p 9-10. 
56 Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of International 
Law 50 (2008): 393-405, 403. 
57 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 249, par. 493. 
58  See Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. Downs. The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law. Stanford Law Review (2007): 595-631. 
59 For example, see Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter. International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual 
Agenda. Am. J. Int'l L. 87 (1993): 205-239. (“For instance, if it could be reliably shown that a great-power 
condominium was the best guarantee of international peace, then international law and organization should 
accommodate and support an arrangement that confers special privileges on a group of great powers. On the other 
hand, if the prospects for peace hang on some other set of characteristics, then international security organizations 
and norms designed to regulate the use of force should be reshaped accordingly.”) 
60  See Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of 
International Law 50 (2008): 393-405, 404. 
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fact.61 And “it is not surprising that the real world . . . is one of blotches, blends, and blurs”,62 while 
our academic research language has always been failing to grasp the dynamic rhythm of the reality, 
especially for the regime interactions and evolution/transformation processes in international society.63 
“They are unrealistic because they do not reflect the decentralized nature of the international 
community, a feature which is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. They are inadequate 
because centralism is not a promising recipe for social stability or a better world 
order…These models are also undesirable because they tend to stifle pluralism and cultural 
diversity.”64 
However, it should be noted that it is not argued here that this way of understanding and interpretation 
of international law altogether is not logically right or theoretically reasonable. Actually, this view does 
goods to the understanding of international law as a legal system and the systematic theoretical 
construction of international law, as well as the subsequent application and implementation.65 But all 
those benefits to the theoretical construction of international law and practical interpretation as well as 
implementation thereafter don’t imply that this approach is immune from any critical inspection and 
reflection,66 or that this perspective should be applied to the “fragmentation” debate, not to mention 
that this new approach of revisiting cannot be easily ignored given its rationality. On another level, all 
those benefits and believed advantages may become the otherwise or self-defeating if the conceptual 
                                                            
61 See Koskenniemi, Martti. Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law. Eur. J. Int'l L. 8 (1997): 
215. 
62 See Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan. Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p 35. 
63 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 14-15. (Emphasizing that the fragmentation of international law has two different 
levels. “One is the level of international practice, where what matters is what states and other actors do, whereas 
the other is the level of scholarship. While the two influence each other without a doubt, care should be taken to 
keep them separate and not mix them up entirely.”) 
64 See Schreuer, Christoph. The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International-Law?. 
European Journal of International Law 4.1 (1993): 447-471, 449. 
65  See Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of 
International Law 50 (2008): 393-405. (“This approach has contributed significantly to the emergent conception of 
international law as a legal system. The system of norms constitutes a map that guides lawyers in their search for 
applicable norms, and empowers judges to fill lacunas, interpret treaties, manage the interface between different 
treaties, and in general develop and further solidify the system. Probably the most significant political outcome of 
the vision of international law as a legal system is the empowerment of courts to develop international law beyond 
the intention of governments, and the equalizing effect of a coherent and consistent interpretation and application 
of the law.”) 
66  See Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of 
International Law 50 (2008): 393-405, 396. (“This legal discourse empowers primarily judges, whose province is 
not to promote the good and the efficient, but rather to proclaim what is legal. Their authorization to assert what 
the law is requires them to use the lawyers’ tools to reach specific conclusions. The vision of international law as a 
legal system rather than a mix of discrete treaties allows them to interpret, deduct, draw inferences and resolve 
conflicts not only by resorting to the specific treaties at hand but also by relying on the basic principles of the 
system and its underlying norms.”) 
13 
premises and methodological methods are just slightly changed, apart from entirely overthrew.67 And 
those changes, based on and oriented to either international legal practices or theoretical arguments, can 
occur anywhere at any time in conceptual arguments and theoretical debates, if it is necessary.68 
“Fragmentation puts to question the coherence of international law. Coherence is valued 
positively owing to the connection it has with predictability and legal security. Moreover, 
only a coherent legal system treats legal subjects equally. Coherence is, however, a formal 
and abstract virtue. For a legal system that is regarded in some respects as unjust or 
unworkable, no added value is brought by the fact of its being coherently so. Therefore, 
alongside coherence, pluralism should be understood as a constitutive value of the system. 
Indeed, in a world of plural sovereignties, this has always been so.”69 
Simply here, it aims to clearly point out that this notion of “the fragmentation of international law” is 
developed in those above-analyzed cognitive perspectives and methodological approaches.70 And 
those clear, thorough analyses of them are believed to be helpful for a reflective and critical revisit of 
the concept of “fragmentation” and “institutional fragmentation”, about its historical development 
processes, changing connotations and its referents.71 It is worthwhile to anticipate that all those would 
                                                            
67 For example, “[a]s a result of this implicit authorization, perhaps the most significant political outcome of the 
vision of international law as a legal system is the empowerment of courts to develop international law beyond the 
intention of governments. The systemic or constitutional conception of international law supplies relatively 
independent bureaucracies and judiciaries with doctrines that enable them to expand their authority while 
maintaining coherence and consistency through broad interpretation of treaties and the development of customary 
international law.” But the so-called “coherence and consistency” here may not be the appropriate or the 
equivalent merits of international law, as it may be just a cognitive result or outcome of this vision and all the 
premises. And it possibly becomes the obstacle to correctly understand the ethos of international law if we choose 
other different premises for our reasoning. See Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal 
System. German Yearbook of International Law 50 (2008): 393-405, 396. Regarding the relationship of 
fragmentation and coherence in international law, see ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 248, par. 491.  
68 For example, “[t]he proliferation of informal means of creating inter-state commitments, as well as the growing 
reliance on coordination among private actors, challenge the vision of international law as a coherent legal system. 
The assumption that states cannot contract out of international law, an assumption most recently articulated by the 
International Law Commission, seems increasingly in tension with political, social, and economic realities.” See 
Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of International Law 
50 (2008): 393-405, 404. 
69 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 248, par. 491. 
70 For example, disparities found in the abundant literature on the topic could also be read as representative of 
European (formalist) and American (realist) approaches to international law. See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The 
Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 
1-28, 2. 
71 “The impetus for such an analysis emerged from the finding that over the last 150 years, international lawyers 
have had recourse to the language of fragmentation as an argument for criticism and contestation.” “We shall see 
that the play between integration and disintegration, and more generally between unity and diversity, is one of the 
discursive patterns used by the discipline to deploy criticism and propose reform projects.” See Martineau, 
Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of 
International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 2-3. 
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be conducive to better understand, and thus possibly better explain, the current fragmentation debate’s 
legal assumptions and broader implications. 
 
  
15 
2.3 THE CONCEPT OF “FRAGMENTATION” AND “INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAGMENTATION” REVISITED 
 
Under the context of the analogy between international law and national law in this “fashionable 
debate”72 and “complicated language”73, the concern of the “fragmentation of international law”, as a 
threat to the alleged “unity and coherence” of international legal system, is repeatedly emphasized for a 
lot of times on many occasions,74 whether it’s about the proliferation of international regimes and 
institutions from the perspective of a coherent order of regimes and their interaction, or the “normative 
specialization” and “institution-building” from the perspective of top-down vision of international law 
as a consistent legal system,75 or the expansion of international law’s scope and the diversification of 
international regulation networks from the perspective of international law’s pragmatic functions.76  
  But it seems that the conceptual and methodological presuppositions of international law’s 
fragmentation are inadequately reviewed or reflected, notwithstanding other aspects of the 
fragmentation in international law are already so much emphasized, analyzed and argued, with 
attention to their legal nature, systematic damages, potential causes and possible solutions.77 The 
connotations of international law’s fragmentation lie closely with the descriptive effectiveness and the 
analytically explanatory power of a few concepts in international law, including the unity of 
international law, the international legal pluralism and the regime interaction. That’s because the 
                                                            
72 See Lindroos, Anja, and Michael Mehling. Dispelling the Chimera of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ International 
Law and the WTO. European Journal of International Law 16.5 (2005): 857-877. (“It has become fashionable to 
claim that international law is becoming increasingly fragmented, and that its supposed unity as a decentralized 
system of rules is threatened by an expanding scope and a multiplicity of international judicial bodies.”) 
73 See Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 9. 
(“Fragmentation, as we shall see in the rest of the this book, raises a host of important questions of a legal, political, 
technical and ideological nature. The literature on fragmentation is not only abundant: it is also extremely dense, 
diverse, complex and – in its own way – fragmented.”) Also see Dupuy, Pierre-Marie. A Doctrinal Debate in the 
Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of International Law. Eur. J. Legal Stud. 1 (2007): 1. (Fragmentation 
has become the doctrinal debate par excellence in this globalization era.) 
74 For example, see Wellens, Karel C. Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some 
Reflections on Current Trends. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 25 (1994): 3-37. (The study focuses on 
the application of “secondary rules” in specialized regimes and endeavors to find out “whether they would become 
a potential risk, constituting a threat to the global unity and efficacy of the international legal order.” And the 
conclusion of this paper is comparatively optimistic, arguing that “the secondary rules……promoted and 
guaranteed the growing effectiveness of their own particular set of primary rules, without putting in jeopardy the 
unity or coherence of the international legal order.”) 
75 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 3. 
76 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 244, par. 481. (“[T]he emergence of technically 
specialized cooperation networks with a global scope”) 
77 It can be sensed with the following example: the influence of the ideology of legal centralism on the discussions 
of legal pluralism. See Griffiths, John. What is Legal Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law 18.24 (1986): 1-55. 
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concept of fragmentation, as well as the language of fragmentation in international law, is developed 
with deeper touches, broader links and bigger scores. Those concepts, as the theoretical precondition of 
the fragmentation debate, are so vital to the discussions that it should never be easily let go without 
in-depth analyses and all-sided deliberations. So, before further and detailed discussion on the 
fragmentation of international law, what about those premises and preconditions promoting the concept 
of fragmentation in the analogy between international law and national legal systems? This paper 
mainly focuses on two core ones here: legal pluralism, and the unity of international law in the play 
between unity and diversity in international law.  
  Originally and traditionally in domestic legal systems, legal pluralism is defined as to the study of 
the coexistence of indigenous and Western law in old colonial territories as well as the emergence of 
types of private law in domestic societies.78 Scholars for this paradigm of pluralism believe that legal 
centralism is an ideal illusion that unreasonably holds academia’s structural imagination, while legal 
pluralism is the constitutive reality.79 And the official legal system tends to be the secondary, other 
than the assumed primary, locus of regulation,80 with repeated rediscovery of the other hemisphere of 
the legal world.81 
Legal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion. 
Nevertheless, the ideology of legal centralism has had such a powerful hold on the 
imagination of lawyers and social scientists that its picture of the legal world has been able 
successfully to masquerade as fact and has formed the foundation stone of social and legal 
theory. A central objective of a descriptive conception of legal pluralism is therefore 
destructive: to break the stranglehold of the idea that what law is, is a single, unified and 
exclusive hierarchical normative ordering depending from the power of the state, and of the 
illusion that the legal world actually looks the way such a conception requires it to look.82  
                                                            
78 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 11, par. 8, footnote 13. Also see VAN, COTT, and Donna 
Lee. A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia. Journal of Latin American Studies 32.01 
(2000): 207-234. 
79 See Galanter, Marc. Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law. The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 13.19 (1981): 1-47, 18. (“‘Legal centralism’ has impaired our consciousness 
of ‘indigenous’ law”.) 
80 See Galanter, Marc. Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law. The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 13.19 (1981): 1-47, 20. 
81 See Weber, Max. Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. Ed. Max Rheinstein. Vol. 84. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1954, p 16-20, 140-149. Also see Fuller, Lon L. The Morality of Law. Vol. 152. Yale 
University Press, 1969, p 123. (The plural or multiple character of law in a society is taken note of.) 
82 See Griffiths, John. What is Legal Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 18.24 (1986): 
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As said by John Griffiths, this debunking with “clear empirical thought”83 should be continued and this 
false comparison with the idealized picture of law in modern society needs to be rectified. The 
never-ending shock of the gap between the realistic approach of empirical investigation and the ideal 
conceptions as well as ideologies should be envisaged, decompressed and reconstructed, thus to better 
analyze the role of law in a society and better define the concept of law.84 Moreover, that is definitely 
far-reaching and transformative for a more comprehensive and penetrating grasp of the alleged 
“institutional fragmentation of international law”. 
“In sum, pluralism offers not only a more comprehensive descriptive account of the world we 
live in, but also suggests a potentially useful alternative approach to the design of procedural 
mechanisms, institutions, and practices.”85 
Despite that those interpretative concepts essentially are used in national legal systems and the 
fragmentation issue is mainly argued in international law, the conceptual premises linked and 
transmitted through the analogy between national legal system and international law are of the same 
kind and in substantially identical texture.86 That’s why this concept of legal pluralism could be 
interpretative and expositive to the alleged institutional fragmentation of international law and further 
on the “ethos” of international law. However, when the concept of legal pluralism is transferred into 
international law for interpreting the issue of the unity/diversity play in international law,87 which 
gives rise to the debate on international legal pluralism, the past shadow of legal pluralism in national 
legal systems should be refused to go on haunting the debate between unity and pluralism in 
international law. And it is sequacious and misleading to artificially set up unity and pluralism as two 
opposite perspectives of international law’s fragmentation so as to be consistent with the traditional 
paradigm. That’s because compared to national legal systems, the correspondent structure of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1-55, 4-5. (The word in bold is originally highlighted in the original text.) 
83 See Griffiths, John. What is Legal Pluralism?. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 18.24 (1986): 
1-55, 5. 
84 See Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism. S. Cal. l. Rev. 80 (2006): 1155. (“[W]e need to realize that 
normative conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems is unavoidable and might even sometimes be 
desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple community affiliations. 
Thus, instead of trying to stifle conflict either through an imposition of sovereigntist, territorially-based prerogative 
or through universalist harmonization schemes, communities might sometimes seek (and increasingly are creating) 
a wide variety of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing, without eliminating, 
hybridity.”) 
85 See Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism. S. Cal. l. Rev. 80 (2006): 1155. 
86 See Teubner, Gunther. Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In Teubner, Gunther. Global 
Law Without a State. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, p 3-28. (“Global law can only be adequately explained by a 
theory of legal pluralism which turned from the law of colonial societies to the laws of diverse ethnic, cultural and 
religious communities in modern nation-states.”) 
87 See Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism. S. Cal. l. Rev. 80 (2006): 1155. (Legal pluralism “helps us 
understand the global legal environment”.) 
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international law and the “local context” of this world society or international community are 
completely different, which makes this analogy feels like “why is a raven like a writing desk”.88   
  And it is basically the same thing for the concept of “unity” in the argument of national legal 
system’s coherence and international law’s fragmentation: refuse the shadow of the past, and embrace 
the fear of the future.89 In international law, the traditional concept of “unity” in national legal systems 
is far from capable to capture the “peculiar characteristics” of international law as fully-fledged law.90 
On the other way around, this projected “unity” of international law probably exists as conceptual 
obstacles and cognitive biases.91 
“For nation-building in the past, unity of the law was one of the main political assets - a 
symbol of national identity and simultaneously a symbol of (almost) universal justice. A 
worldwide unity of the law, however, would become a threat to legal culture. For legal 
evolution the problem will be how to make sure that a sufficient variety of legal sources 
exists in a globally unified law. We may even anticipate conscious political attempts to 
institutionalize legal variation, for example, at regional levels.”92 
Therefore, in the first place, the academia needs to inspect whether it is workable and feasible to go 
along with this language of fragmentation using those projected concepts. Namely, what does the 
concept of “fragmentation” really mean and stand for, and how should it be critically constructed in 
this debate? The following is the revisiting to the concepts. 
 
2.3.1. The Evolution of the Concept of “Fragmentation” 
Many scholars have provided various interesting and controversial interpretations, with both 
descriptive and analytical, both comparative and ontological, both forward-looking and historical 
                                                            
88 See James D. Fry. China’s Version of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention: Comparing Ravens and Writing Desks?. K.L.J. 2013, 24(1), 60-84. 
89 See Pauwelyn, Joost. Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-connected 
Islands. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 903. (“At the same time, fragmentation is not necessarily a bad thing, nor will 
it disappears anytime soon. Law making and law enforcement by specialized organizations are likely to lead to 
better law. Regulatory competition may increase efficiency and provide a laboratory for the development of new 
legal instruments. Moreover, the diversity of states means that not all states have the same interests and hence that 
not all states will want to, or should, join all treaty-regimes.”) 
90 See Teubner, Gunther. Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In Teubner, Gunther. Global 
Law Without a State. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, p 4, 8.  
91 If the concept of “unity” is expected to be used in international law to describe the practical function, the 
theoretical connection and systematic structure of all those international legal rules, namely international law as a 
legal system, then “unity” of international law should be endowed with new connotative meanings. See Pauwelyn, 
Joost. Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-connected Islands. Mich. J. Int'l 
L. 25 (2003): 903. 
92 See Teubner, Gunther. Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In Teubner, Gunther. Global 
Law Without a State. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, p 8. 
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perspectives, 93  so as to vest the scholarship to comprehensively and critically understand this 
phenomenon of fragmentation as well as empower this fragmentation debate the role of ab uno disce 
omnes onto deeper theoretical issues and the broader texture of international legal system.94  
  For instance, Martineau, Anne-Charlotte, as being curious about the revival of fragmentation in the 
international legal discourse after the new millennium, innovatively contextualized the “fragmentation” 
debate back to those historical periods and approached this issue from the perspective of legal rhetoric, 
arguing about the correlation between the general macroclimate of international society and the 
sub-environment of the perception of the fragmentation debate, along with uncovering underlying 
“implicit assumptions and political implications” of this continued debate on fragmentation.95 Despite 
that it contains a possible risk of falling back to stereotype and oversimplification,96 its historic 
interpretation of the politics of fragmentation and its connotations throughout the past several centuries 
is valuable. Different researchers highlight this concept of “fragmentation” on various dimensions, 
from diverse perspectives, with different approaches,97 and on different levels.98 But various alleged 
or designated connotations behind those different facets reveal some common merits and peculiarities 
of this language of fragmentation.  
  Firstly, from a descriptive perspective with regards to the healthy evolution of sub-fields of 
international law and co-existence of the treaties thereof, the possible emergence of “treaty 
                                                            
93 For example, “hence, in order to offer a full account of the politics of fragmentation, the historical perspective 
will need to be complemented with an analytical or structural one.” See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric 
of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 3. 
94 For example, see Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties. Leiden Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553-579. See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The 
Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 
1-28. See Dupuy, Pierre-Marie. A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of 
International Law. Eur. J. Legal Stud. 1 (2007): 1. Also see Koskenniemi, Martti. Lauterpacht: The Victorian 
Tradition in International Law. Eur. J. Int'l L. 8 (1997): 215, 220-221. 
95 Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal 
of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28. 
96 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28. (“‘It has become a platitude to say that international law is 
changing’, said Maurice Bourquin at The Hague Academy of International Law in 1931. Some seventy five years 
later, it is still commonplace to address international law in terms of its evolution.” And it claims that the play 
between unity and diversity is “one of the discursive patterns used by the discipline to deploy criticism and 
propose reform projects”. This “periodization method” is privileged therein to emphasize the cyclic recourse to the 
language of fragmentation.) Also see Kennedy, David. When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box. NYUJ 
Int'l L. & Pol. 32 (1999): 335. Kennedy, David. International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an 
Illusion. QLR 17 (1997): 99. 
97 As for different and even opposing approaches taken by European (formalist) and American (realist) academia 
to international law, it is quite clear just by comparing these literatures of some seminars on this topic. For 
example, see Romano, Cesare PR. The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle. 
NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 (1998): 709. Also see Symposium Introduction by Author/Symposium Introduction by 
Title/Symposium Conclusion by Author. 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. vii (2003-2004). 
98 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 14-15. 
20 
congestion” 99  in international environmental law, which would give rise to “substantive 
incompatibility” and “operational inefficiency”,100 had already been highlighted by Weiss, Edith 
Brown several decades ago (1992). Then some scholars have used “regime complex”101 to illustrate 
the connotation of the “fragmentation” of international law (2004). It is thus presupposed that those 
“overlaps and uncoordinated regimes” would lead us to be confronted with a new and somewhat 
paradoxical situation, where the believed “integrity and unity of international law” is impaired not by 
the underdevelopment of regimes but rather by the overdevelopment of regimes and legal rules 
(2007).102 And the basic and prevalent meaning of “fragmentation” in today’s debate upon the 
fragmentation of international law and sub-areas of international legal regulation is as follows: 
fragmentation refers to the threatening consequence of excessive, explosive or kaleidoscopic normative 
expansion and institutional specialization (2009).103 This diversification, expansion and specialization 
of international legal rules represent the prodigious development of international legal regulation, and 
can be reflected in the “greater density, complexity, and diversity” of its normative network and 
institutional flux.104 And “the proliferation of different legal regimes and institutions governing 
inter-state relations”105 would be a good summary of the connotations of the so-called “fragmentation” 
in modern international law, particularly for the “institutional fragmentation” aspect herein. 
  Secondly, from a more interpretative and constructivist viewpoint, Niklas Luhmann’s notion of 
“functional differentiation”, which has been developed to explain the evolution of late-modern societies, 
                                                            
99 See Weiss, Edith Brown. International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New 
World Order. Geo. LJ 81 (1992): 675. Also see Hicks, Bethany Lukitsch. Treaty Congestion in International 
Environmental Law: The Need for Greater International Coordination. U. Rich. L. Rev. 32 (1998): 1643. 
100 See Weiss, Edith Brown. International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New 
World Order. Geo. LJ 81 (1992): 675, 697-699. 
101 Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. International 
Organization 58.02 (2004): 277-309, 279. (“We term the collective of these elements a regime complex: an array 
of partially overlapping institutions governing a particular issue-area, among which there is no agreed upon 
hierarchy.”) 
102 See Kanwar, Vik. International Emergency Governance: Fragments of a Driverless System. Available at SSRN 
978361 (2007). (“From a practical standpoint, this points to the potential of confusion regarding applicable law 
caused not by gaps or black holes but by overlaps and uncoordinated regimes. From a theoretical standpoint, this 
Article argues that the driverless features of these multiple regimes, and their attempts at coordination, reveal 
deeper anxieties concerning the status and coherence of international law as a whole.”) Also see Martineau, 
Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of 
International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 4. 
103 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006). Also see Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of 
Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 4. 
104 See Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 
(1998): 919, 925. 
105 Benvenisti, Eyal. The Conception of International Law as a Legal System. German Yearbook of International 
Law 50 (2008): 393-405, 402. 
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is transposed to international law to describe the emergence of autonomous technical “boxes” that cater 
for special audiences with special interests and special ethos (2003, 2009),106 under the context of a 
world society where international cooperation and legal regulation are happening everywhere.107 But it 
is also pointed out that the so-called “self-contained regime” is an inappropriate and “misleadingly 
labeled”108 concept, literally, as none of these bodies of law could be created, interpreted and applied 
in a “clinical vacuum”.109 All those different parts of international law (as a legal system) constitute a 
“constellation” or a “living organism”,110 which by definition is correlated within the international 
legal order through “highways”111 connections.112 Accordingly, the evolution and specialization of 
international law is certainly not the opposite side of “the unity of international law”, despite that both 
of them should be someway balanced and coordinated in the academic researches with ontological 
investigations as well as analogical analyses.113  
“As things become more complex, they reflect a higher degree of division of labor, or 
specialization, which is a higher stage of evolution. But the participants in this process must 
be conscious of its direction and requirements. The further the division of labor and 
                                                            
106 See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in 
the Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999, 999-1000. (“In 1971, while theorizing on the 
concept of world society, Luhmann allowed himself the “speculative hypothesis” that global law would experience 
a radical fragmentation, not along territorial, but along social sectoral lines.”) Also see Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. 
The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden Journal of International Law 22.01 
(2009): 1-28, 4. See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Politics of International Law–20 Years Later. European Journal of 
International Law 20.1 (2009): 7-19, 9. 
107 For example, one similar narrative is “the transition from nationally organized societies to a global society”. 
See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999, 999-1000. 
108 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 11. (The article refers to it as “misleadingly labeled ‘self-containment’”.) 
109  See WTO Appellate Body. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996. Also see Marceau, Gabrielle Zoe. A Call for Coherence in International Law: 
Praises for the Prohibition against “Clinical Isolation” in WTO Dispute Settlement. Journal of World Trade 33.5 
(1999): 87-152. See Simma, Bruno, and Dirk Pulkowski. Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law. European Journal of International Law 17.3 (2006): 483-529. (“‘Conceptual’ arguments for 
so-called self-contained regimes are unconvincing.”) 
110 See Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 
(1998): 919, 920-921. 
111 See Schachter, Oscar. International Law in Theory and Practice. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: M. Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1991, p 1. 
112 See Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 
(1998): 919, 926. (“But however autonomous and particular these may be, there cannot be a totally self-contained 
regime within the legal order. If the special regime is to remain part of the legal order, some relationship, however 
tenuous, must subsist between the two. Otherwise, if all links are severed, the special regime becomes a legal order 
unto itself—a kind of legal Frankenstein, or Kelsen’s “gang of robbers”—and no longer partakes in the same basis 
of legitimacy and formal standards of pertinence.”) 
113 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 15, par. 17. (“The fragmentation of the international legal 
system into technical ‘regimes’, when examined from the point of view of the law of treaties, is not too different 
from its traditional fragmentation into more or less autonomous territorial regimes called ‘national legal 
systems’.”) 
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specialization, the greater the need for the preservation of the unity of the whole that makes 
specialization possible and meaningful, but which becomes harder to maintain because of the 
centrifugal effects of specialization.”114 
Thirdly, from a more analytically and internally precise perspective of different phases of the 
international legal system, fragmentation is defined to contain two aspects by the 2006 ILC Report and 
many other literatures: the normative and institutional fragmentation, respectively.115 The normative 
aspect refers to the substantive conflict of international legal rules as the consequence of the 
institutional fragmentation,116 while the latter institutional aspect is more concerned about international 
overlapping law-making, regime interactions and “tribunal fatigue”117 in a globalized world.118 
Moreover, normative fragmentation stands for the debate on the application and interpretation of 
international law as a unique legal order,119 as well as potential mitigation measures respectively (“the 
quasi-judicial part”),120 while institutional fragmentation pays extensive and focused attention to the 
abstract unity of international legal system, regime interactions and international law-making therein 
(“the quasi-legislative part”).121 And the 2006 ILC Report uses the concept of “self-contained regime” 
                                                            
114 See Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 
(1998): 919, 925. 
115 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 13, par. 13. 
116 The normative fragmentation is “the substantive question - the splitting up of the law into highly specialized 
“boxes” that claim relative autonomy from each other and from the general law”. See ILC. Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the 
Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 
April 2006), p 13, par. 13. 
117 See Alford, Roger P. The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International Adjudication in 
Ascendance. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 94 (2000): 160. Also see Romano, Cesare PR. The Proliferation of 
International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 (1998): 709. 
118 See Boyle, Alan E., and C. M. Chinkin. The Making of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007, p 1-40. (For example, “fragmentation is also seen in the variety of law-making processes and the separate 
legal regimes that exist alongside and within the international legal order.”) 
119 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 166, par. 324, p 249, par.493. (“Much of the concern over 
the fragmentation of international law emerges from the awareness of the “horizontal” nature of the international 
legal system. The rules and principles of international law are not in a hierarchical relationship to each other. Nor 
are the different sources (treaty, custom, general principles of law) ranked in any general order of priority. This is a 
key difference between international and domestic legal systems.” “The international legal system has never 
enjoyed the kind of coherence that may have characterized the legal orders of States.”) 
120 For example, see Harrison, James. Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International 
Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p 242-277. 
121 Her in this thesis, it is argued that the institutional aspect should be paid more attention since it is more 
fundamental and vital for our understanding of and possible solution to this debate of fragmentation. For example, 
see Van Asselt, Harro, Francesco Sindico, and Michael A. Mehling. Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation 
of International Law. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 423-449. (“This article concludes that a narrow focus on conflicts 
misrepresents the multifaceted nature of climate change and precludes an adequate jurisprudential understanding 
of the relationship between the climate regime and other regimes. An improved understanding, particularly with 
respect to interactions with the biodiversity regime, requires a broadening of the debate that takes account of the 
institutional aspects of these relationships that may allow enhanced political cooperation and coordination. Further, 
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to delineate the bigger picture of institutional fragmentation arising from the diversification and 
expansion of international law, and elucidates the normative fragmentation with case studies.122 
Although the emphasized facets of the concept of “fragmentation” may have been changing through 
time, 123  the conceptual preconditions and assumptions of both normative and institutional 
fragmentation remain almost the same, and the referent both on the level of theoretical argument and 
practical implication frequently overlap and integrate.124 And that’s why it is not advisable to 
overemphasize the division or their difference between the normative aspect and institutional 
counterpart. When it comes to the correlation and interaction of normative fragmentation and the 
institutional aspect, the normative expansion and the multiplication of specialized regimes is a healthy 
and consequent match.125 
  Thus, it is shown that theoretical premise of all those concerns on the fragmentation of international 
law can be defined as follows: international law, as an international legal system which is presumed to 
be similar with national legal systems by a close analogy, is confronted with the risk of diversification 
and specialization because of a lack of overall structure planning or overarching hierarchical design in 
the development of international legal rules.126 And that anxiety mainly comes from the multiplicity of 
judicial bodies and proliferation of international law-making regimes, with their own “special”127 
institutional frameworks respectively, thus potentially causing normative conflicts and regime 
                                                                                                                                                                          
international law, and in particular the emerging concept of systemic integration, has the potential to make a 
positive contribution to the climate-trade interplay.”) 
122 The ILC identifies three potential forms of normative fragmentation: the emergence of deviating interpretations 
of general international law; emergence of institutionalized exceptions to general international law; the clash of 
particular laws. See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 248-249, par. 491-493.  
123 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28, 4. (“Although its connotation has certainly changed over time 
(technically speaking, fragmentation has referred to the elaboration of highly detailed treaties, to the establishment 
of regional institutions, to the setting up of specialized jurisdictions, etc.), its denotation has remained the same: to 
invoke fragmentation is to evoke an image of chaos, explosion.”) 
124 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 14, par. 14. Also see Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation 
or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 (1998): 919, 925-926. (“To each level of 
normative density, there corresponds a level of institutional density necessary to sustain the norms”.) 
125 See Abi-Saab, Georges. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 
(1998): 919, 925-926. (“Complexification creates a need for specialized tribunals to accommodate normative 
diversification and specialization.”) 
126 See Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553, 575-576. Also see Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public 
International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 191-193. 
127 See Koskenniemi, Martti. Study on the Function and Scope of the lex specialis Rule and the Question of 
“Self-Contained Regimes”. Preliminary Report by the Chairman of the Study Group submitted for consideration 
during the 2004 session of the International Law Commission’(unpublished, on file with the author), UN Doc. 
ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1/Add.1 (2004), par. 134. (Martti Koskenniemi suggested that “special regimes” is a more 
appropriate term than “self-contained regime”.) 
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complex.  
  This is the first preliminary conclusion regarding the analogical origin and conceptual referent of the 
concept of “fragmentation” in this debate of the fragmentation of international law. And the analogy 
between international law and any other legal systems started from the early process of 
professionalization of international law.128 However, this thesis does not agree with this conceptual 
premise whether it is conceived as a methodological approach or used as any theoretical argument, and 
this disagreement will be elaborated in the later sections. 
  The second point is that the intensification and aggravation of this fear of “fragmentation” arise from 
the explosive development of international law, as a result of both expanded scope of international 
legal order and the deepening of global social sectorial specialization.129 Compared to traditional 
international law and international legal regulation, the 20th century and 21st century has witnessed a 
huge proliferation of international regulatory regimes on the global level and competing, overlapping as 
well as complementary regional arrangements on the regional level.130  
“Nevertheless, its functioning as a system faces the challenge of specialisation and the 
unbalanced and irregular institutional growth of its diverse sectors. The debate on 
fragmentation of international law which essentially tended to turn on the emergence of 
specialized dispute settlement mechanisms is a clear expression of this phenomenon.”131 
For example, in the field of international trade law, international intellectual property law, as an 
                                                            
128 See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern 
Law Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30. Also see Lauterpacht, Hersch. The Function of Law in the International 
Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, p 432. 
129 See Hafner, Gerhard. Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law. Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its fifty-second Session, UN Doc. A/55/10 (2000), 321-353. As for the “sectoral 
differentiation”, see Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999, 1009. (“The traditional 
differentiation in line with the political principle of territoriality into relatively autonomous national legal orders is 
thus overlain by a sectoral differentiation principle: the differentiation of global law into transnational legal 
regimes, which define the external reach of their jurisdiction along issue-specific rather than territorial lines, and 
which claim a global validity for themselves.”) 
130 See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in 
the Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999. 1009. (“Global regulatory regimes certainly 
give us a picture of the fundamental transformation of global law from territorial to a sectoral differentiation, …”) 
The most appropriate, representative and remarkable example for this coexistence and competition between 
globalism and regionalism is the international trade law, including global trade structures (such as WTO and 
World Bank) and regional trade arrangements (EU, NAFTA and FTAAP). See Baldwin, Richard E. 
Multilateralising Regionalism: Sphagetti Bowls as building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade. The World 
Economy 29.11 (2006): 1451-1518. Also see Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. Multilateral Determinants 
of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. International 
Organization 57.04 (2003): 829-862. Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. Institutions in 
International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. International 
Organization 61.01 (2007): 37-67. See Goldstein, Judith L. The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and 
Economics of the GATT and the WTO. Princeton University Press, 2008.  
131 See Zapatero, Pablo. Modern International Law and the Advent of Special Legal Systems. Ariz. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 23 (2005): 55, 63. 
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indispensable and also one of the most controversial components of any global trade agreement and 
regional trade arrangement,132 has been astonishing and overwhelming with its historical evolution 
processes and current development dynamics;133 and as a result of the complexity and extensity of the 
correlation between intellectual property and other legal issues (such as human rights, environmental 
protection and cultural diversity in this world society),134 the regime interactions within international 
IP law and beyond onto other international regimes are fierce and active.135 And it is almost the same 
thing with the specialization and auonomization of those international regimes, either it is presented as 
“self-contained boxes”136 as a result of “functional differentiation” or “legal diversification and 
specialization” as a result of “sectoral differentiation”.137 Different informal labels like “international 
trade law”, “international human rights law”, “international environmental law” and “international 
intellectual property law” are characterized at the discretion of big powers for their national interests 
                                                            
132 For example, in these regimes of NAFTA, WTO, TPP, FTAAP, and other global, regional and bilateral trade 
agreement, as well as investment protection agreement, intellectual property is a core element of the negotiation 
processes and the treaty text. It is the similar thing with some other topics, like environmental protection. See Sell, 
Susan K. Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p 37-39, 76. As for the globalization and the international harmonization process of IP 
protection, see Yu, Peter K. Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime. Loy. 
LAL Rev. 38 (2004): 323. See Boyle, James. A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property. Duke 
L. & Tech. Rev. 2004 (2004): 9-15. See Grossman, Gene M., and Edwin L-C. Lai. International Protection of 
Intellectual Property. The American Economic Review 94.5 (2004): 1635-1653. See Yu, Peter K. The 
Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach about Intellectual Property and International Trade. Fordham 
Int'l LJ 26 (2002): 218. 
133 See Yu, Peter K. Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime. Loy. LAL Rev. 
38 (2004): 323. (Arguing that: the backwards tracking of the historical development of the international intellectual 
property regime demonstrates that those regimes are products of repeated interactions between various sets of 
currents and crosscurrents. While the currents of multilateralism push for uniformity and harmonization, the 
crosscurrents of resistance enable countries to retain diversity while engaging in continuous legal 
experimentation.) 
134 For example, see Raustiala, Kal. Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law. UC Davis L. 
Rev. 40 (2006): 1021. (“The increasing intersection of IP and human rights appears inevitable, and it will alter the 
shape and the trajectory of legal rules in both camps. To understand the future of both IP and human rights law we 
must think systematically about how the rising density of the international system affects the processes of 
rulemaking.”) 
135 See Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. International 
organization 58.02 (2004): 277-309. (“Given the rising density of international institutions, we suggest that an 
increasingly common phenomenon is the “regime complex”—a collective of partially-overlapping regimes. We 
suggest that regime complexes evolve in special ways. They are laden with legal inconsistencies because the rules 
in one regime are rarely negotiated in the same fora and with the same interest groups as rules in other regimes.”) 
Also see Helfer, Laurence R. Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking. Yale J. Int'l L. 29 (2004): 1. (The international intellectual property system 
provides an important illustration of how regime complexity shapes domestic and international strategies of states 
and non-state actors. This article describes and graphically illustrates the multifaceted nature of the international 
intellectual property system. It then analyzes the consequences of regime complexity for international and 
domestic politics, emphasizing the strategy of regime shifting and its consequences for chessboard politics and the 
domestic implementation of international rules.) 
136 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 13-14, par. 13. 
137 See Helfer, Laurence R. Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking. Yale J. Int'l L. 29 (2004): 1, 81-82.  
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and preferences in international politics and negotiations on the one hand,138 and on the other hand for 
the sake of professional specialization in the academic community of international legal studies.139 
Actually, this functional and technical specialization approach not only results from the “natural 
evolution” of the practical needs in international governance and regulation, but also is an “artificial 
selection” with conceptual preferences and purposeful orientations early in 1920s,140 despite that those 
subjective “cosmopolitan” constructions and “global law” plans didn’t come true,141 and that those 
inherent tensions in international legal discourse and the nature of international law as a legal system 
are still inadequately explored.142  
                                                            
138 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 17, par. 21. (“They are only informal labels that describe 
the instruments from the perspective of different interests or different policy objectives. Most international 
instruments may be described from various perspectives: a treaty dealing with trade may have significant human 
rights and environmental implications and vice versa. A treaty on, say, maritime transport of chemicals, relates at 
least to the law of the sea, environmental law, trade law, and the law of maritime transport. The characterizations 
have less to do with the “nature” of the instrument than the interest from which it is described.”) Also see 
Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern Law 
Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30, 4-8. (“Such characterizations are not intrinsic to the relevant problem but emerge from 
the interest or preference from which it is examined. This is where, as I have elsewhere written, fragmentation 
becomes struggle for institutional hegemony.”) See Koskenniemi, Martti. International law and Hegemony: A 
Reconfiguration. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17.2 (2004): 197-218, 205-206. 
139 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 129, par. 254. (The report points out that: those terms 
such as “human rights law”, “trade law” or “environmental law” and so on are arbitrary labels on forms of 
professional specialization.) And this is neither the only cost nor the first time that the so-called professional 
specialization of international law accidentally does damages to a better understanding of the ethos of international 
law and also the fragmentation of international law specifically herein. See Lauterpacht, Hersch. The Function of 
Law in the International Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, p 432-433.   
140 See Paz, Reut Yael. Making It Whole: Hersch Lauterpacht's Rabbinical Approach to International Law. 
Goettingen J. Int'l L. 4 (2012): 417. (“Both the rabbis and Lauterpacht seem to have made a similar turn into the 
world of the legal text, its significance, interpretations and possibilities, arguably as the result of being greatly 
disappointed by the loss of "a powerful sovereign" to begin with. It is possible that Lauterpacht's endeavors, just 
like the rabbinical attempts centuries before his time, were simply to create a space apart from the arbitrariness of 
power politics, a room that allows for the creation of an extra-territorial, ahistorical space that is over and above 
the turmoil of the present and where law rules in a supreme way.”) Also see Koskennemi, Martti. Hersch 
Lauterpacht (1897-1960). In Beatson, J., and Reinhard Zimmermann. Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking Émigré 
Lawyers in Twentieth-Century Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p 601-661, p 613-614. 
141 See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern 
Law Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30, 14-15. (“Lauterpacht and other inter-war lawyers were right to assume that 
statehood would be slowly overcome by the economic and technical laws of a globalizing modernity. This is what 
functional differentiation in both of its forms - fragmentation and de-formalization - has done. But they were 
wrong to believe that this would lead into a cosmopolitan federation”) Also see Reisman, W. Michael. Sovereignty 
and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law. American Journal of International Law (1990): 866-876. 
142 See Lieblich, Eliav, and Yoram Shachar. Cosmopolitanism at a Crossroads: Hersch Lauterpacht and the Israeli 
Declaration of Independence. British Yearbook of International Law (2014): bru004. (“This article contributes to 
international legal theory by discussing unexplored tensions in Lauterpacht’s work – tensions that have reached 
their boiling point in his draft declaration. Their incidence, and his attempts to resolve them, are telling not only 
regarding Lauterpacht’s jurisprudence, but also revealing of the nature (and limitations) of international legal 
argument at large. Namely, they reflect the inherent tension in international legal discourse between 
cosmopolitanism and sovereignty, universalism and particularism. We argue that by participating in a national 
project, Lauterpacht’s cosmopolitanism was compromised. His attempt to reconcile, in the Draft, between 
cosmopolitanism and national sovereignty – an attempt so common in the argumentation of international lawyers – 
ultimately led not only to the Draft’s rejection by the nascent Israeli establishment, but also, perhaps, to its 
downplaying by those that have reconstructed Lauterpacht’s cosmopolitan legacy.”) 
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“Indeed, it is no too far-fetched to suggest that the fragmentation of international law goes 
hand in hand with a process of verticalization: the system is no longer exclusively made up, 
as it still was in earlier days, of independent and sovereign states who famously interact as if 
they are billiard bals on the green sheet of a pool table. …… The previous emphasis on states 
sovereignty, resulting in the images of international law as a horizontal legal order made up 
of equals, so the sovereignty goes, is slowly giving way to a conception of international law 
as more vertical organized. The subsystems that give rise to fears (or hopes) of fragmentation 
are, in this conception, independently functioning regimes where business is being done, 
indeed, which are eventually themselves doing the business, overcoming the traditional 
paradigm of states sovereignty.”143 
In sum, the believed or alleged “integrity and unity of international law” is impaired not by the 
underdevelopment of international legal rules and regimes, or simply by the overdevelopment of 
international legal rules and regimes, but rather by the overdevelopment of international legal rules and 
regimes in a direction and a way that is different from the conceptually presupposed “overall plan”144 
regarding international law as a legal system.145 And, of course, the broader context of this assertion is 
still the lack of hierarchy (“decentralized” nature) in a world society and the “ethos” of international 
law always tooted in the fragmentation debate.146  
“The debate about the unity of international law is full of paradoxes, and therein lies the 
fascination it exerts on its participants. Not only are opposite views voiced simultaneously; a 
great irony also lies at the very core of the whole issue. The ‘‘fragmentation’’ of 
international law did not arise out of some intrinsic weakness in a legal order which, based 
on unsteady foundations and paralyzed by the specter of sovereignty, is prevented from 
developing and slowly disintegrates. On the contrary, it actually arose from the 
                                                            
143 Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009, p 14. Also see Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the 
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999 
144 See Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553, 575-576. Also see Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public 
International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 191-193. 
145 Prost, Mario, and Paul Kingsley Clark. Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How 
Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?. Chinese Journal of International Law 
5.2 (2006): 341-370, 343.  
146 See Pauwelyn, Joost. The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?. American 
Journal of International Law (2001): 535-578. (For example, “the WTO treaty, WTO panels, and the Appellate 
Body were not only created in the wider context of public international law; they continue to exist in that 
context”.) 
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unprecedented normative and institutional expansion of international law, often into new 
areas. It is because international law is in fact evolving and because institutions are being 
created to ensure its implementation and, occasionally, its enforcement that there now exists 
this growing concern for its unity. The irony, then, lies in the fact that international lawyers, 
having long fought for the recognition of ‘‘their’’ law as ‘‘real’’ law, are now concerned that 
there may be an excess of international law. In other words, the achievements of 
international law may institute its own downfall.”147 
However, deeper insights and fundamental reflections from empirical investigation as well as realistic 
legal studies, on the underlying causes of this fragmentation debate and seemingly systematic crisis in 
public international law and subfields of international law, have been long overdue,148 while the 
shadow resulting from the unexamined analogical reasoning and conceptually presupposed stereotypes 
continues to tarnish the academic value of the concept of “fragmentation” and even disable its potential 
outputs of further theoretical implications on the development of international legal system in a world 
society.149 The side effects of this paradigm are too methodologically damaging and essentially 
impertinent to be overlooked or ignored.150 
  And the third noteworthy point is that this language of fragmentation seems to constantly emerge 
onto and along with various arguments of many topics in the field and subfields of international law, 
                                                            
147 Prost, Mario, and Paul Kingsley Clark. Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How 
Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?. Chinese Journal of International Law 
5.2 (2006): 341-370, 343.  
148 See Alford, Roger P. The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International Adjudication in 
Ascendance. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 94 (2000): 160. (It argues that “the proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals represents a profound change in international law and international relations”, but this change of 
landscape has not been reflected with enough attentions.) At least, “imaginative uses of its traditional techniques” 
with consideration to those changes and transformation on varying degrees should be called for. See ILC. 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 246, par. 487. 
149 See Ole Spiermann. Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law. EJIL (2007), Vol. 18 No. 5, 789-790. (“In its 
deep structure, international law is neither the constitution of an international community nor a tailor-made 
instrument of global governance, almost whatever those terms mean.”) Also see Hafner, Gerhard. Risks Ensuing 
from Fragmentation of International Law. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
fifty-second Session, UN Doc. A/55/10 (2000), 321-353.  
150 See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in 
the Fragmentation of Global Law. Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999. 1007. (“Seen in this light, the problems of 
global society, namely environmental degradation, spectacular social under-provision and stark discrepancies in 
life and development potential, have an underlying cause that must be framed in terms of functional differentiation 
and autonomous systems dynamics; by the same token, it is simply inappropriate to explain the problems raised by 
global finance markets, hedge funds, financial speculation, pharmaceutical patents, the drug trade and reproductive 
cloning within a political paradigm, and with a solving faith within the potential of political solutions. Such 
problems are caused by the fragmented and operationally closed functional systems of a global society, which, in 
their expansionist fervor, create the real problems of the global society, and who at the same time make use of 
global law in order normatively to secure their own highly refined sphere logics.”) 
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elusively and perpetually.151 That makes this fragmentation debate or language become more of a 
rhetoric metaphor of fundamental concerns of international law as a legal system and the tip of the big 
“shifts and evolution of international law” iceberg. How to understand the fragmentation language in 
the “the rhetoric of fragmentation of international law” approach, from the efforts to interpret 
international law as analogous to any other legal systems in 1930s, 152 to the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals in late 20th century,153 and to the rethinking of the asserted 
“post-ontological era” 154  in this “modern era of fragmentation” 155 ? Why this language of 
“fragmentation of international law” is always raised up with unexplainable anxieties and 
pre-configured orientations? And what are the potential and foreseeable effects of this “postmodern 
anxiety”156 onto the development of international law in a world society?157 Is that why this concept of 
“fragmentation” has been fuzzified and been ambiguous?  
“Fragmentation, pluralism, and verticalization are very much in the eye of the beholder. As 
Martti Koskenniemi recently wrote, what looks like fragmentation from one perspective may 
look more like unity from a different vantage point. More importantly, perhaps, to the extent 
that these phenomena take place, they take place on two distinct levels. One is the level of 
international practice, where what matters is what states and other actors do, whereas the 
other is the level of scholarship. While the two influence each other without a doubt, care 
should be taken to keep them separate and not mix them up entirely: the circumstance that 
many academics write about fragmentation as such only means that many academics write 
about fragmentation, and interpret certain events and trends as indicating fragmentation. 
While there usually is no smoke without fire, still it does not mean that therewith 
fragmentation becomes an irreversible fact or trend, and strictly speaking, it does not even 
                                                            
151 See Martineau, Anne-Charlotte. The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22.01 (2009): 1-28 
152 See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern 
Law Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30. Also see Lauterpacht, Hersch. The Function of Law in the International 
Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, p 432. 
153 See Buergenthal, Thomas. Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 14.02 (2001): 267-275. Also see Kingsbury, Benedict. Foreword: Is the Proliferation 
of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem. NYUJ int'l L. & pol. 31 (1998): 679. See Pocar, Fausto. 
The Proliferation of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals - A Necessity in the Current International 
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154 Franck, Thomas M. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p 6. 
155 Khrebtukova, Alexandra. A Call to Freedom: Towards a Philosophy of International Law in an Era of 
Fragmentation. J. Int'l L & Int'l Rel. 4 (2008): 51. 
156 See Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553, 575-576. 
157 For example, see Teubner, Gunther. Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In Teubner, 
Gunther. Global Law without a State. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, p 3-30. 
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imply that fragmentation ‘really’ exists.”158 
From the perspective of legal rhetoric, this concept of “fragmentation” can be disambiguated, 
deconstructed and reconstructed to a more pure and original sense.159 And either specific or general 
“structural biases” are equipped within or demonstrated onto the specialization of international law 
with their own preferred idiom, career prospects, and those different or even opposite arguments in the 
language of fragmentation is a good example. 160  Only by penetrating through those different 
fragmented terms and obscure descriptions of the “augmented realities”161 could insights and judgment 
be achieved, connection and systematic intergrowth be expected.162 
  The fourth preliminary concluding point is that there are disconnections and miscommunications 
between the overall theoretical researches in international law and specific question-oriented studies in 
sub-areas of international law,163 which leads to the dilemma that the accumulatively progressive 
deepening of theoretical researches in public international law is accompanied by sustained-ly 
inappropriate, ambiguous theoretical frameworks and conceptual presuppositions in the studies of 
sectoral legal regulations.164  
  The famous metaphor, firstly coined by Oscar Schachter, considers general international law as the 
                                                            
158 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 14-15. 
159 For example, see Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. 
The Modern Law Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30. (“Reducing international law to a mechanism to advance functional 
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International Law 20.1 (2009): 7-19, 9. (“This is why much about the search for political direction today takes the 
form of jurisdictional conflict, struggle between competing expert vocabularies, each equipped with a specific 
bias.”) 
161 Taking the concept of “unity” in international law for example, see Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in 
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162 See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern 
Law Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30, 7. (“In a world of plural regimes, political conflict is waged on the description and 
re-description of aspects of the world so as to make them fall under the jurisdiction of particular institutions.”) 
163 This kind of disconnection has been narrated form different perspectives with various arguing purposes and 
conclusions. For example, see Pauwelyn, Joost. The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can 
We Go?. American Journal of International Law (2001): 535-578. Also see Sands, Philippe. Treaty, Custom and 
the Cross-fertilization of International Law. Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. LJ 1 (1998): 85, 88. (“The separate subject 
matter areas are treated as a part of general international law, but often presented as organically disconnected from 
each other. The whole is made up of a collection of fragmentary parts, the implication being that the different parts 
only seldom, if ever, connect.” “Norms arising in different subject matter areas can and do touch. They co-mingle 
and compete. These apparently distinct subject matter areas do not exist in a state of isolation.”) 
164 For example, Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires the interpretation 
of international legal texts should be interpreted with “other relevant rules of international law” in the context 
taken into account, in a systematic way or similar method. See Sands, Philippe. Treaty, Custom and the 
Cross-fertilization of International Law. Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. LJ 1 (1998): 85, 86-87. (“Article 31(3)(c) has a 
potentially generic application, which could encompass the relationships between other areas and other norms, 
including human rights and development, trade and labor, and even the law of the sea and human rights.”) 
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highways between the otherwise isolated villages of international law,165 and now in academic 
researches those highways are not that efficient any more, especially when international law is always 
undergoing changes.166 And one of those fitting and representative examples is this debate on the 
(institutional) fragmentation of international law and this debate in subareas of international law. On 
the one hand, theoretical researches on the play between unity and diversity in international law is in 
ever-increasing deepening, which undoubtedly would and should shed light on the understanding of the 
fragmentation debate with more insights on the “ethos” of international law.167 And, on the other hand, 
arguments and reasoning on the fragmentation issue in specific subfields of international law, such as 
international trade law, international IP law, international institutional law and the so-called global law, 
are still engaged with wrong theoretical frameworks or vague presuppositions.168  
  This kind of “disconnections and miscommunications” happens not merely downwards in specific 
sub-areas of international law on the front lines, but also upwards in the broad context of international 
law as a legal system.169 And one of the most severe consequences of this sort of asymmetry and 
disconnection is that the referent and the connotations of this concept of “fragmentation” have already 
been and tend to become more vague, evasive and elusive, not to mention those detailed 
elaborations;170 and the role of this concept of “fragmentation”, in theoretically conducting and closely 
linking the branches of international law and public international law, has been gradually and greatly 
                                                            
165  Schachter, Oscar. International Law in Theory and Practice. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: M. Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1991, p 1. 
166 Although it is quite a stereotype to say that international law is ever-changing. For example, see a conference 
on ‘The Changing Structure of International Law Revisited’ convened by the Institut des hautes études 
internationales and the European Journal of International Law in March 1997. Papers on four themes appeared in 
EJIL volume 8, numbers 3 and 4 in 1997, and volume 9, number 1 and 2 in 1998. 
167 As for the play between unity and diversity in international law, see Dupuy, Pierre-Marie, Denis Alland, 
Vincent Chetail, Olivier de Frouville, and Jorge E. Viñuales. Unité et diversité du droit international: ecrits en 
l'honneur du professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy. 2014. Also see Schermers, Henry G., and Niels Blokker. 
International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011. 
168 Prost, Mario, and Paul Kingsley Clark. Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How 
Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?. Chinese Journal of International Law 
5.2 (2006): 341-370. (“This essay proposes to address the preliminary question which, in fact, precedes and 
underpins all the others as regards the multiplication of IOs and international legal unity: how do IOs matter in the 
making of international law?”) 
169 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 15-16. (“Moreover, increasingly with fragmentation too, the constitutionalist 
discussion takes on ‘constitutionalist’ dimensions, if you will, and understandably so: there is a deep-seated 
anxiety that merely to respond to fragmentation by invoking general international law will be insufficient. Instead, 
in order to keep fragmented units together, something of a higher status must be involved and invoked, and it is 
precisely constitutionalism, or constitutionalization, that promises to be able to create some order in what 
otherwise would be chaos. Fragmentation, in yet other words, would lose some of its risks because it would, on the 
constitutionalist view, always be subject to higher imperatives.”) 
170 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 14-15. Also see Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. 
Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 13. 
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diminished and weakened.171 
“Law as a theoretical and analytical device is a concept which embraces a category of 
phenomena (ethnographic facts) selected according to the criteria the concept specifies. 
Although it is composed of a set of individual phenomena, the category itself is not a 
phenomenon – it does not exist in the outer world. The term ‘law’ consequently is applied to 
a construct of the human mind for the sake of convenience. The justification of a concept 
does not reside in its existence outside the human mind, but in its value an as analytical, 
heuristic device.”172 
The vitality and value of a legal concept lies in its explanatory power, which is composed of its 
capability to provide an analytical summary and interpretative construction, as well as to carry and 
illuminate a certain kind of facts/phenomena under certain backgrounds.173 With the help of empirical 
studies and other devices, legal concepts should be able to supply convincing theoretical constructions 
and practical guidelines.174 As a result, this concept of “fragmentation” actually is teetering on the 
brink of bankruptcy, as a result of the ambiguity of its referent and connotations.175 This is a 
problematic issue and also a legal phenomenon that arises with increasing frequency.176 
                                                            
171 See Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 9. 
(“Fragmentation, as we shall see in the rest of the this book, raises a host of important questions of a legal, political, 
technical and ideological nature. The literature on fragmentation is not only abundant: it is also extremely dense, 
diverse, complex and – in its own way – fragmented.”) 
172 See Pospisil, Leopold J. Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory. New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p 39. 
173 For example, see Singleton, Royce, Bruce C. Straits, and Margaret Miller Straits. Approaches to Social 
Research. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p 20-21. (“Concepts are abstractions communicated by 
words or other signs that refer to common properties among phenomena”. “Similarly, scientist develop special 
concepts because they are useful for understanding……This implies a third rule about language usage in science: 
concepts are judged by their usefulness.”) Also see Wisker, Gina. The Postgraduate Research Handbook: Succeed 
with your MA, MPhil, EdD and PhD. Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p 55. 
(“Operationalizing a concept or idea means putting it work for you – open up and questioning what seems an idea 
we just take for granted; problematizing something that seems to be accepted by everyone; and then breaking it 
down into issues and questions about which one can ask further questions and observe interesting contradictions, 
elements, problems, changes, opportunities and ideas about which you can seek to research.”) 
174 Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern Law 
Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30. (“The emergence of regimes resembles the rise of nation States in the late nineteenth 
century. But if nations are ‘imagined communities’, so are regimes.”) 
175 For example, see Chimni, Bhupinder S. The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third 
World Approach. Melb. J. Int'l L. 8 (2007): 499, 509. (“But the flaw within the current celebration of 
fragmentation and its criticism is that both perspectives reify the concepts of fragmentation and unity. The 
concepts of fragmentation and unity are perceived as things and not part of a historical process that can be 
reconciled at a different site. Formal logic, to put it differently, rules out the unity of opposites. It helps disregard 
the fact that the future may see a fragmented international law reunite to reflect the interests of the transnational 
capitalist class. In other words, the earlier unity has necessarily to split to create a new unity. The nostalgia for a 
lost world blinkers a generation of international lawyers to the new configuration of global social forces that drives 
both fragmentation and unity. If a new unified international law that is responsive to the fate of global subalterns is 
to be created, it is imperative to imagine suitable alternative futures.”) 
176 One similar example is the concept of “sovereignty”. For instance, see Reisman, W. Michael. Sovereignty and 
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law. American Journal of International Law (1990): 866-876. 
(“Although the venerable term ‘sovereignty’ continues to be used in international legal practice, its referent in 
modern international law is quite different.” “International law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, 
33 
  The fifth point is that modern international legal theories and academic researches in the twenty-first 
century, with the specific problem-oriented method, functional approach and pragmatism 
methodology,177 fault with traditional international legal theories, which leads to those scorching 
arguments and dissensions on several significant and decisive topics including, but not necessarily 
limited to, the ethos of international law as a legal system, the unity of international law, and herewith 
the institutional fragmentation of international law.178 And sometimes, it even leads to the revival of 
defensive ontology to justify and prove the existence of international law.179 Therefore, it is far too 
early to say that “international law has entered its post-ontological era”180, if those ontological ethos are 
forgotten and the “risks ensuing from fragmentation of international law” 181  are just another 
resurgence of providing an apologia pro vita sua.182 
“This liberty was short-lived. After the passage of only 10 years, the legitimacy of 
international law is already back in the spotlight. Whilst it is no longer questioned in terms of 
its existence as a legal order worthy of the name, it is, nonetheless, challenged as regards its 
unity. Faced with the contemporary explosion of legal norms, increasing normative 
specificity, the proliferation of international organizations and the multiplication of 
international tribunals, some have highlighted the risk of ‘‘fragmentation’’ of international 
law into a more or less coherent set of ‘‘normative islands’’ constituted by partial, 
autonomous and perhaps even ‘‘self-contained’’ legal sub-systems.”183 
Although “it is essential that international lawyers should develop an attitude of criticism in regard to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
but, in its modern sense…”) 
177 For example, see Dunoff, Jeffrey L., Steven R. Ratner, and David Wippman. International law: Norms, Actors, 
Process: A Problem-oriented Approach. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002. Also see Johnston, Douglas M. 
Functionalism in the Theory of International Law. Can. YB Int'l L. 26 (1988): 3. 
178 See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern 
Law Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30, 28. (“In order to begin re-imagining international law, it is first necessary to see in 
what way the internationalism of Lauterpacht and his generation is no longer plausible.”) 
179 See Prost, Mario, and Paul Kingsley Clark. Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How 
Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?. Chinese Journal of International Law 
5.2 (2006): 341-370, 342-343. Also see Lauterpacht, Hersch. The Function of Law in the International Community. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, p 434. (“But this is an additional reason why it should be construed on the basis of 
what is best and most developed in legal experience-not on the basis of the emaciated, fragmentary, and 
historically questionable experience of primitive communities in past ages. It is of the essence of the dignity of 
legal science-including the science of international law-to resist the temptation to lower the standard of law to the 
low level of an avowedly rudimentary practice.”) 
180 Franck, Thomas M. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p 6. 
181 Hafner, Gerhard. Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law. Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its fifty-second Session, UN Doc. A/55/10 (2000), 321-353. 
182 It means “an apology for itself”. See Henkin, Louis. International Law: Politics and Values. Dordrecht: M. 
Nijhoff, 1995, p 3. 
183 Prost, Mario, and Paul Kingsley Clark. Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How 
Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?. Chinese Journal of International Law 
5.2 (2006): 341-370, 342. 
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the very effective -- although now somewhat trite -- argument that law is not a panacea”,184 it is quite 
realistic and to admit that international law is an indispensable tool to regulate the international 
relations of states and to predict the accumulative achievements of international politics.185 And it is 
also of great significance to admit that the modern international law is still fundamentally limited and 
continually developed in the traditional framework of national sovereignty and those processes of 
international politics as well as international relations, as statehood and national sovereignty are still 
core elements of contemporary international law, both at this time and in the foreseeable future.186 
  All in all, through this study on the fragmentation of international IP law, we can carry out an 
in-depth reflection on how to embrace, understand and make use of the “ethos” of international law in 
contemporary international legal researches, particularly here onto the fragmentation debate. That is a 
radical and essential step for many other issues and studies in international law. 187 Then, by 
specifically narrowing down to the issues in the field of international intellectual property law, the 
verification and improvement of those theoretical arguments can be conducted in a case-study approach. 
Jus as Ronald St. J. Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston wrote more than three decades ago, a focus 
on theory is increasingly needed in a field such as international law that has been driven to great 
degrees of both specialization and fragmentation.188 
                                                            
184 See Lauterpacht, Hersch. The Function of Law in the International Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, 
p 437. 
185 The core feature and underlying goal of a “rule-oriented structure” is creating greater predictability, redressing 
unfair power imbalances, and preventing escalating international tensions’. See Jackson, John H. The World 
Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, p 340. 
See Jackson, John H. The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System. Journal of World Trade 12.2 (1978): 
93-106. Also see Pauwelyn, Joost. Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and International Standards 
and How they May Outcompete WTO Treaties. Journal of International Economic Law (2014): jgu042. (“a 
transition can be made from rule-based trade 1.0, focused on output and effect, to rule-based trade 2.0, ensuring 
both output predictability, stability, and neutrality and input legitimacy and coherence”.) 
186 Lauterpacht tried to overcome the negative effects of this statehood on international law, but up to now those 
endeavors by generations of international lawyers are still far from making a success. See Koskenniemi, Martti. 
The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern Law Review 70.1 (2007): 
1-30, 14-15, 27-28. Also see Koskenniemi, Martti. The Politics of International Law–20 Years Later. European 
Journal of International Law 20.1 (2009): 7-19. (“[T]he most important political conflicts in the international world 
are often legally articulated as conflicts of jurisdiction and applicable law.”) See Koskenniemi, Martti. The Politics 
of International Law. European Journal of International Law 1.1 (1990): 4-32. (It made the point about the 
inevitability of “politics” in the profession of public international law.) See Niemeyer, Gerhart. Law Without Force: 
The Function of Politics in International Law. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001. 
187 See Hafner, Gerhard. Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law. Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its fifty-second Session, UN Doc. A/55/10 (2000), p 132, par.731. (“The Commission 
took note that the last topic, ‘Risks ensuing from fragmentation of international law’, was different from other 
topics which the Commission had so far considered. Nevertheless, the Commission was of the view that the topic 
involved increasingly important issues relating to international law and that the Commission could make a 
contribution to the better understanding of the issues in this area. The Commission also took note that the method 
and the outcome of the work of the Commission on this topic, while they did not fall strictly within the normal 
form of codification, was well within the competence of the Commission and in accordance with its statute.”) Also 
see Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 9. 
188 See Macdonald, Ronald St. J., and Douglas M. Johnston. The Structure and Process of International Law: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine, and Theory. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, p 1-3. 
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2.3.2. The Evolution of the Concept of “Institutional Fragmentation” 
When it comes to the “institutional fragmentation” of international law here in this thesis, it refers to 
the fear of the academia about “the increased proliferation of international regulatory institutions with 
overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries”,189 or the perceived threat arising from “the 
ongoing proliferation of special regimes endowed with strong institutional frameworks and an ability to 
set new international norms”,190 or the fundamental disconnects and institutional gaps that have 
hitherto impeded attempts to develop synergistic systems of international law and policy,191 on the 
level of the theoretical studies of international law.192 Despite that potential conflict of rules is the 
main concern of “normative fragmentation” and “fragmentation” on the level of international legal 
practices, “some degree of normative interaction and overlap” 193  is merely one aspect of the 
fragmentation issue and simply the prelude of concerns as well as academic studies on the institutional 
fragmentation of international law. Therefore, the interaction of those regimes,194 the correlation of 
their international law-makings in a world society,195 corresponding influences on the function and 
development of international law,196 and, most importantly, how to understand and interpret those 
                                                            
189  Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. Downs. The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law. Stanford Law Review (2007): 595-631, 596. 
190 See Lindroos, Anja, and Michael Mehling. Dispelling the Chimera of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ International 
Law and the WTO. European Journal of International Law 16.5 (2005): 857-877. 
191 See Piñon Carlarne, Cinnamon. Good Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law 
Away?. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 450-480, 450. 
192 See Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p 14-15. (Emphasizing that the fragmentation of international law has two different 
levels. “One is the level of international practice, where what matters is what states and other actors do, whereas 
the other is the level of scholarship. While the two influence each other without a doubt, care should be taken to 
keep them separate and not mix them up entirely.”) 
193  See Van Asselt, Harro, Francesco Sindico, and Michael A. Mehling. Global Climate Change and the 
Fragmentation of International Law. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 423-449, 424. 
194 For example, see Oberthür, Sebastian, and Thomas Gehring. Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental 
Governance: Synergy and Conflict Among International and EU Policies. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006. 
Also see Van Asselt, Harro, Francesco Sindico, and Michael A. Mehling. Global Climate Change and the 
Fragmentation of International Law. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 423-449. 
195 See Helfer, Laurence R. Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking. Yale J. Int'l L. 29 (2004): 1. Also see Yu, Peter K. International Enclosure, the 
Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia. Mich. St. L. Rev. (2007): 1. 
196 Alter, Karen J., and Sophie Meunier. The Politics of International Regime Complexity. Perspectives on Politics 
(2009): 13-24. (“The increasing density of international regimes has contributed to the proliferation of overlap 
across agreements, conflicts among international obligations, and confusion regarding what international and 
bilateral obligations cover an issue. This symposium examines the consequences of this "international regime 
complexity" for subsequent politics. What analytical insights can be gained by thinking about any single 
agreement as being embedded in a larger web of international rules and regimes? Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier 
s introductory essay defines international regime complexity and identifies the mechanisms through which it may 
influence the politics of international cooperation. Short contributions analyze how international regime 
complexity affects politics in specific issue areas: trade (Christina Davis), linkages between human rights and trade 
(Emilie Hafner-Burton), intellectual property (Laurence Heifer), security politics (Stephanie Hofmann), refugee 
politics (Alexander Betts), and election monitoring (Judith Kelley). Daniel Drezner concludes by arguing that 
international regime complexity may well benefit the powerful more than other.”) 
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phenomena and interplays from ontological, historical as well as comparative perspectives,197 are the 
core components of the studies hereof on this topic: the institutional fragmentation of international (IP) 
law in a world society.  
  And, more specifically, investigations are needed on the establishment, evolution and interaction of 
those regimes in a certain sub-area of international law,198 and special attention should be paid to the 
formulation as well as future application of international legal rules within those regimes in order to 
better unfold and review the regimes interactions in accordance with the “the law of universal 
gravitation”199 of regime interaction of international legal regimes.200 All aspects of the “evolutionary 
process”201 of those regimes and the overall landscape of international (IP) law could reveal some parts 
of the “institutional fragmentation” mystery in this world society, like the blind men’s elephant, 
because of the synergies and strengthening effects therein.202 And afterwards, those observations and 
interpretations are capable of looking back, reflecting and redefining how should this “fragmentation” 
and “institutional fragmentation” debate take the next step towards a more enlightening and clarifying 
direction. 
  Undoubtedly, prior to all of those elaborations and argumentations at great length, understanding the 
                                                            
197 For example, see Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties. Leiden Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553, 575-576. 
198 This mitigates some scholars’ concerns on the use of “regime” in international legal studies, and more 
importantly, provides an empirical and comprehensive perspective on the institutional fragmentation of 
international IP law in a world society. See Young, Margaret A. Toward a Legal Framework for Regime 
Interaction: Lessons from Fisheries, Trade, and Environmental Regimes. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 105 (2011): 107, 
108. (“As developed in international law jurisprudence, and restated in the ILC's seminal 2006 fragmentation study, 
‘special regimes’ is a term used to describe semi-autonomous branches of international law (especially where 
primary rules are tied to secondary rules concerning the consequences of breach), as well as whole bodies of 
professional specialization and expertise. The international relations scholarship similarly emphasizes the 
convergence of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures in set issue-areas of international concern. 
Yet there are major problems in this conception of contained normativity. For one, focusing on regimes may 
obscure the general principles and overall system of international law. There is also a danger in reducing regimes 
to a single set of characteristics, which may preclude a debate about those characteristics or their evolution. The 
danger is especially great if it forecloses the process of regime interaction.”) 
199 It implies that those regimes in international law also inter-connect and interact in a similar way, with general 
rules and laws directing their evolution and competition, just like the law of universal gravitation for all the objects 
in this universe. As for the hologram theory and more discourses on holographic universe, see Bohm, David, and B. 
J. Hiley. The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Also see Talbot, Michael. The Holographic Universe. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1996. 
200 See Margaret A. Young. Trading fish, Saving Fish: the Interaction between Regimes in International Law. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p 113-124. Also see Young, Margaret A. Toward a Legal 
Framework for Regime Interaction: Lessons from Fisheries, Trade, and Environmental Regimes. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 
Proc. 105 (2011): 107, 108. 
201 See Koh, Harold Hongju. Why Do Nations Obey International Law?. Yale LJ 106 (1997): 2599-2697, 2603. 
202  See Van Asselt, Harro, Francesco Sindico, and Michael A. Mehling. Global Climate Change and the 
Fragmentation of International Law. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 423-449. (“This article concludes that a narrow 
focus on conflicts misrepresents the multifaceted nature of climate change and precludes an adequate 
jurisprudential understanding of the relationship between the climate regime and other regimes. An improved 
understanding, particularly with respect to interactions with the biodiversity regime, requires a broadening of the 
debate that takes account of the institutional aspects of these relationships that may allow enhanced political 
cooperation and coordination.”) 
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definition, the connotations and the evolution of “institutional fragmentation”, as a legally principled 
and theoretically constructed concept in this debate of international law’s fragmentation, is the starting 
point.203 
  At the very beginning, the “institutional fragmentation” in international law mainly stands for the 
anxieties upon the increasing number of international judicial institutions, both courts and arbitration 
tribunals, regionally and globally.204 And it was not highly concerned or heatedly discussed until it was 
particularly emphasized by ICJ judges,205 asserting that this proliferation might create inconsistency 
and conflicts among judgments, thus jeopardizing “the unity of international law” and international 
law’s role in international relations. 206  The aftermath of the outburst of this “institutional 
fragmentation” debate in international law is that the concept of “institutional fragmentation” has been 
gradually spreading out onto other topics with similar contexts and concerns,207 and innovatively shed 
new light on other universal phenomena and issues, such as the proliferation of new international 
norm-setting mechanisms,208 interaction of international law-making regimes and other international 
                                                            
203 As for the importance of conceptual analysis, see the discourses at the beginning of this chapter. Also see 
Buzan, Barry. From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the 
English School. International Organization 47.03 (1993): 327-352, 327. (The paper argues about the importance of 
a clear definition of “international society” and “international system”: “Without such a boundary, the concept of 
international society is too fuzzy to be used either for comparative analysis of different international systems or for 
analysis of the historical development of any given international society.”) 
204 See Romano, Cesare PR. The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle. NYUJ 
Int'l L. & Pol. 31 (1998): 709. See Charney, Jonathan I. The Implications of Expanding International Dispute 
Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. American Journal of International Law (1996): 
69-75. See Spelliscy, Shane. The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor. Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 40 (2001): 143. See Alford, Roger P. The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: 
International Adjudication in Ascendance. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 94 (2000): 160. (“concern over ‘tribunal 
fatigue’.”) 
205 See Gilbert Guillaume. The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International 
Legal Order. Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, to 
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 October 2000. Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1. Also see Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi 
Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden Journal of International Law 15.03 
(2002): 553-579. 
206 See Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553-579, 555. (Institutional fragmentation “may jeopardize the unity of 
international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations”.) Also see Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. 
Downs. The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law. Stanford Law 
Review (2007): 595-631, 597. (Arguing that the institutional fragmentation “operates to sabotage the evolution of 
a more democratic and egalitarian international regulatory system and to undermine the normative integrity of 
international law.”) 
207  For example, the regime interaction and regime complex in many branches of international law, and 
international governance of many issues, including human rights, environmental protection, public health, cultural 
diversity and so on. That also contributes to the development of the so-called “Global Administrative Law”. See 
Hassel, Anke. The Evolution of a Global Labor Governance Regime. Governance 21.2 (2008): 231-251. See Haas, 
Peter M. Addressing the Global Governance Deficit. Global Environmental Politics 4.4 (2004): 1-15. Also see 
Deere Birkbeck, Carolyn. Global Governance in the Context of Climate Change: The Challenges of Increasingly 
Complex Risk Parameters. International Affairs 85.6 (2009): 1173-1194. 
208 For example, see Betts, Alexander. Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime. Perspectives on 
Politics 7.01 (2009): 53-58. Also see Forman, Shepard, and Derk Segaar. New Coalitions for Global Governance: 
The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
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regulatory bodies in those subfields of international law,209 as well as international law’s general 
formulation and integral implementation.210 
  There are mainly three reasons for this proliferation and stretch of the “institutional fragmentation” 
concept: the background (the dominance of the top-down-approach academic studies in international 
law); concept’s good explanatory power (“institutional fragmentation” could illustrate the premier 
sources and the ultimate answers of those “chaos” in this world society); international regimes’ 
prosperity as international law-makers (international regimes have got actual legal authority as main 
contributors of international law).  
  Firstly, this one-more-step-forward approach, going beyond the original scope of institutional 
fragmentation arguments on international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, should be contextualized in 
the bigger backdrop of the progressively increasing discussions on top-down approaches in 
international politics as well as international law in the past several decades, such as “global 
governance”, 211  “international institutional law”, 212  and “global administrative law”. 213  As the 
concept of “institutional fragmentation” could help the academia to better unfold and carry out the 
scroll of the argumentation and reasoning on how to enhance the management and coordination of 
international regimes and regulatory mechanisms,214 it is more than often assimilated to express views 
alike in the parallel top-down approach.215 That is the broad and overall contextual background of the 
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diffusion and stretch of the concept of “institutional fragmentation” in international legal studies.  
  Secondly, many international legal scholars find it more pertinent to focus on those concepts 
involved with “institutional fragmentation”, including institutional jurisdiction, law-making processes, 
interaction and evolution of international regimes, to analyze and mitigate the alleged “side effects”216 
of the fragmentation of international law.217 That’s because the judicial and quasi-judicial judgments 
are just legal application and interpretation of international legal rules (where potential normative 
conflicts of rules are the preliminary manifestations and superficial characterizations), while those 
law-making boundaries and jurisdictions’ overlapping in international regimes are the premier sources 
of normative conflicts and subsequent fluxes, therefore making it highly probably become capable of 
providing ultimate answers for those issues in this debate.218 It is an implicit way of recognizing the 
good explanatory power of this concept and also the perspective.219  
“In truth, however, international law has always been fragmented without losing its ability to 
operate. A threat, rather, arises from the ongoing proliferation of special regimes endowed 
with strong institutional frameworks and an ability to set new international norms.”220 
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“Unlike Fricker, in ‘The Legal Nature’ Radnitzky put the foundation of public law upon the 
concept of power. Further, he genuinely observed the world as a big complex of 
administrative departments or jurisdictions. In a word, Radnitzky transformed the conception 
of territorial sovereignty into the notion of jurisdiction.”221 
And thirdly, international regimes, which are international law makers in this world society on a more 
frequently, more in-depth and comprehensively dimension, have actually got the passport of becoming 
authoritative bodies of international lawmaking.222All those factors contribute to the expansion of the 
concept of “institutional fragmentation” in international law, the same as the “global governance” 
concept.223  
  In summary, historical investigations on the evolution of “institutional fragmentation” as a concept 
in this debate find out that this “institutional fragmentation” concept, as a sub-concept of 
“fragmentation” in international legal studies, is embodied with the same analogy between international 
law and domestic legal systems. And it is also clearly deduced from the historical investigations that 
this concept of “institutional fragmentation” stretched itself originally from the narratives about the 
proliferation of international (quasi-)judicial institutions all the way to today’s role in a more broad and 
controversial debate on international law-making, regime interactions, regimes’ evolutions, and 
international law’s overall development, as a result of three main reasons. 
  Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is no plan, and no point at all in blaming or trying to 
overturn this extension here in this paper, not to mention that methodologically this stretch is 
reasonable and that this is a good opportunity (which necessarily comes sooner or later) for deeper 
reflection about the “institutional fragmentation” debate and international law itself.224 As a matter of 
fact, what is really necessary, valuable, and also may be urgent, is to analyze: could we conceptually 
use “institutional fragmentation” as an entry point to probe into the current dynamics of international 
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regimes’ law-making, interactions and evolution;225 internal powers and external factors of the 
development of international law;226 and further beyond to the texture and ontological “ethos” of 
modern international law in a world society?227 
  It is widely acknowledged that the logic of international law’s development is quite unique, as a 
result of or as an internal part of the unique texture of international law.228 And the ontological “ethos” 
of international law cannot be emphasized too much if it is expected to obtain more dynamic insights 
on international law’s operational characteristics and inherent contradictions.229 Compared to the 
analogical perspective, the explanatory power and theoretical value of this ontological viewpoint have 
not yet been fully understood and recognized. Just as the Report of the International Law Commission 
puts it in 2002: 
“There was also agreement that drawing analogies to the domestic legal system may not 
always be appropriate. It was thought that such analogies introduced a concept of hierarchy 
that was not present on the international legal plane, and should not be superimposed. It was 
suggested that there was no well-developed and authoritative hierarchy of values in 
international law. In addition, there was no hierarchy of systems represented by a final body 
to resolve conflicts.”230 
How to understand the “ontology”, of one thing, is always enigmatic for us.231 And belief in any 
“substance” or “form” of law on the level of essentialism,232 based on national legal systems, may do 
damages to the understanding of international law, if it is rigidly used between national law and 
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international law in a comparative or analogical way.233 Just as said by García-Salmones Rovira, 
Mónica: “International law was neither designed dualistically or monistically. And in the later case, 
state law was either integrated within international law or the other way round (international integrated 
within state law).”234 This “ontological ethos” perspective of international law enables us get rid of all 
those artificial fallacies and unrealistic fantasies, which is either conceptually effective or functionally 
useful. 235  And that’s one of the preconditions for a truly “holographic” and “high-definition” 
understanding of the nature, function and evolution of international law as a legal system.236 
  Specifically, the operational “ethos” of international law-making, whether in the means of 
law-making treaties or through international regimes and organizations, is quite different from that of 
the domestic legal systems.237 And thus, it should be clearly pointed out and always thoroughly 
reflected in the studies of the institutional fragmentation of international (IP) law that interactions of 
international legal regimes, no matter how it is perceived as competition or complementation, the 
so-called “regime-shifting” or “forum-shopping” among international legal regimes within the 
international law-making and international legal regulations processes,238 should not be simplified in 
analogy with domestic legal pluralism or overgeneralized by “international legal pluralism” without 
adequate empirical researches and ontological reflections.239 This kind of labeling has no point in 
explaining or clarifying the true connotations of the concept, rather than merely fuzzification of a 
stigmatized concept to a certain extent. 
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  For example, the proliferation of international legal regimes has been argued for many times as the 
most representative example of the “institutional fragmentation” and the most severe threat to the 
supposed “unity and integrity of international law”.240 And it is taken for granted to argue that the 
emergence of a new regime means that those existing ones are far from well-functioning and 
high-efficiency;241 and this flux of regimes cannot enhance international cooperation or other aspects, 
except just increase the transaction costs of international legal regulation and future law-making.242 
But the establishment of a new regime does not explicitly or directly means that those prior exiting 
international regimes operate ineffectively or inefficiently, as new regimes should be assessed under a 
context of the network of regimes comprehensively.243 Rather, it just implies that new regimes are 
truly needed, on the basis of those existing ones in the international legal system, to accommodate 
some unilateral interests or aspirations of bloc countries, as well as those of one country.244 
“[T]reaty-making is required for international law to give effect to shared interests that 
states are unable to further in their respective national legal systems. In its deep structure, 
international law is neither the constitution of an international community nor a tailor-made 
instrument of global governance, almost whatever those terms mean.”245 
 
“There is no single legislative will behind international law. Treaties and custom come about 
as a result of conflicting motives and objectives - they are ‘bargains’ and ‘package-deals’ 
and often result from spontaneous reactions to events in the environment.”246 
Apparently, this is the actual logic of international law-making and the creation of many international 
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organs, which is one of the ontological “ethos” of international law.247 Any country or group of 
countries in the international community can promote the establishment of a new international 
organization or body so as to pursue the interests of its or their own.248 It is the basic and normal logic 
of the international community that has always been in a world society. Further, in an era of 
globalization nowadays, under the context of multipolarization trends and the continual obstruction of 
multilateralism in the international community, the main negotiating big powers have serious conflict 
of interests, continuous disputes and many divergences on the basic landscape of international 
regimes,249 including basic structures and strategic objectives.250 It is no exaggeration to say that it is 
ever-increasingly difficult to reach international compromises and arrive at substantial agreements,251 
not to mention international cooperation of vital topics containing core interests, at the level of basic 
and overall frameworks.252 It is evident that more and more big powers or groups of countries are 
trying to achieve their interest and demands by methods other than multilateralism, for example, the 
plurilateral doctrine and unilateralism.253 Apparently, the establishment of new international regimes, 
and the proliferation of international regimes, as a result, both are exactly the consequences of the 
tactics mentioned above.254 
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  And also, the so-called “institutional fragmentation” should not be a scapegoat or a resolution for 
any failure of international cooperation or international law’s implementation.255 The “institutional 
fragmentation” of international law and the implementation of international law in a disguised way, 
which might be quite different from those of domestic legal systems, are currently the realities of this 
world society.256 This concept of “institutional fragmentation” should not be used in a vague and 
ambiguous way to cover generalized assertions without adequate legal reasoning and demonstration of 
causality.257 Otherwise, the referents and the connotation of the concept of “institutional fragmentation” 
would be further out of focus, and thus the explanatory power and analytical ability of the concept of 
“institutional fragmentation” would be drastically reduced.258 Amid those researches, analysis and 
reasoning of legal studies, one concept should have its own respective explanatory power and 
analytical ability, that’s to say, the concept must be created to analyze and interpret a certain type of 
facts or phenomena.259 Those propositions that it intends to make may be theoretically analytical, or 
empirically confirmable, and that’s why this concept is meaningful and helpful.260 On the contrary, if 
the usage of a certain concept is similar to that of a vocabulary word in aesthetics and ethics, such as 
“beautiful” or “ugly” which is simply about to express a particular emotion and evoke particular 
responses rather than statements about social facts, then this concept has poor explanatory power in the 
corresponding legal studies, and therefore it is valueless.261 Besides, it cannot be emphasized too much 
to prevent our scholarship from being mired in the abyss of illusion and idealism, and empirical studies 
for reexamining or revisiting various theories are always of great value in jurisprudence.262 
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“Despite the rapid proliferation of international environmental law over the last thirty years, 
many species continue to deteriorate in numbers. The global regimes for the protection and 
management of sharks illustrate how fragmentation and disharmony in international law can 
be damaging.”263 
Taking this failure of the protection and management of sharks under international legal framework for 
example, is it essentially caused by the “institutional fragmentation” of international law? Could it be 
that “institutional fragmentation” is indeed a sort of disease? And if not contaminated with the disease, 
would international law be more systematically healthy and have better capability to cope with a lot of 
contentious issues and disputes in the international community?264 
  Apparently, the answer is negative. Institutional fragmentation is certainly not a disease that 
international law accidentally got infected with, nor is it a defect, a kind of disability or a bug that 
international law should be ashamed of or get rid of.265 Hypothetically, if an answer for the question 
that “what is the so-called ‘institutional fragmentation’ for international law?” must be provided for no 
some reason, then institutional fragmentation is the ontological feature, the “ethos” or the identity of 
international law as a legal system. It is international law that is born with this ontological ethos and 
comparative features among those legal systems.266 What really needs to change for this debate lies in 
the ideology and cognitive perspectives.267 
  Actually, this is far from difficult to imagine and understand it, as just centuries ago, the entire 
western world were still deeply biased against woman, both on the level of conceptual ideologies and 
practical actions, not to mention the discrimination against peoples and persons diagnosed with various 
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263 Techera, Erika J. Good Environmental Governance: Overcoming Fragmentation in International Law for Shark 
Conservation and Management. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 105 (2011): 103. There are so many other similar 
arguments and parallel examples in international environmental law, international trade law and other sub-areas of 
international legal regulation. For example, see Piñon Carlarne, Cinnamon. Good Climate Governance: Only a 
Fragmented System of International Law Away?. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 450-480, 475. 
264 This kind of thinking is widely assumed, rather than analyzed and argued, in the existing literatures of 
“institutional fragmentation” debate. 
265 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 245, par. 484. (“Normative conflicts do not arise as 
technical ‘mistakes’ that could be ‘avoided’ by a more sophisticated way of legal reasoning.”) 
266 See Teubner, Gunther. Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In Teubner, Gunther. Global 
Law without a State. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, p 3-30, 4. 
267 See Brierly, J. L. The Basis of Obligation in International Law, and Other Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1958, p 1-2. 
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diseases. Those women, in themselves, by no means have any alleged “defect”; and those 
characteristics in women, which have been assigned to them by God, are not any kind of diseases that 
need to be healed or bad habits that need to be corrected. 
  As can be seen from all the arguments and assertions above, on a theoretically more in-depth level, 
this debate implicitly contains, greatly urges and requires a delicate exposition on the ontological 
“ethos” of international (IP) law in this world society, since this ontological “ethos” has long been 
downplayed, detached, overlooked and ignored in the debate of the “institutional fragmentation” of 
international law. And for the language of the “institutional fragmentation” of international law, the 
“post-ontological era”268 of “mature and complex” international law is still not coming.269 In terms of 
the demonstration that international law is a self-contained and true legal system, there is a basic 
consensus that the ontology of international law should be seriously taken.270 The cause of “liberating 
the discipline of international law from a sense of its own futility” 271  had already been 
accomplished.272 However, the significance and effectiveness of this ontological perspective, which is 
herein stated as “the ontological ‘ethos’ of international law”, deserves our treasure as a huge mineral 
deposit for more comprehensive and three-dimensional understandings of international law.  
 
  
                                                            
268 Franck, Thomas M. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p 6. 
269 For more review and comments on the “post-ontological era” of international law, see Koh, Harold Hongju. 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?. Yale LJ 106 (1997): 2599-2697. 
270 See Spiermann, Ole. Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law. European Journal of International Law 18.5 
(2007): 785-814, 789. Also see Hafner, Gerhard. Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law. Report 
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its fifty-second Session, UN Doc. A/55/10 (2000), p 
143-144. 
271 See Falk, Richard A. The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law: 
An Intermediate View. In Gross, Leo, Karl W. Deutsch, and Stanley Hoffmann. The Relevance of International 
Law; Essays in Honor of Leo Gross. Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Pub. Co, 1968, p 133, 142.  
272 See Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter. International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda. Am. 
J. Int'l L. 87 (1993): 205-239, 205. (Stating “this is the end of a long journey”.) 
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2.4 THE ONTOLOGICAL “ETHOS” OF INTERNATIONAL (IP) LAW AND THE 
RHETORIC OF “INSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTATION” 
 
Undoubtedly, in international legal studies, international law is considered as a legal system, and also a 
quite unique one.273 And from the perspective of ontological “ethos” of international (IP) law, our 
understanding of this “institutional fragmentation” debate should be reconstructed, renewed and even 
reversed, compared to traditional analogical arguments of “institutional fragmentation of international 
(IP) law”. 
 
2.4.1. The Ontological “Ethos” of International (IP) Law 
Firstly, on the level of the application, interpretation and implementation of international law，
international law is “case-based applied”, 274  “auto-interpreted” 275  (by states) and “disguised 
implemented”,276 even for the basic principles of international law277 and international jus cogens.278 
  Nowadays, although the international legal system has quite many momentous advances as a unique 
legal system on the whole and international legal order is gradually shaping, international legal rules 
are still cased-based applied and interpreted at the discretion of powers and politics, and implemented 
                                                            
273 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10), p 240, 
para. 506. Also see ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 248-249, par. 492-493. 
274 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 27, par. 41. (“And negotiation is rarely about the 
‘application’ of conflict-rules rather than trying to find a pragmatic solution that could re-establish the disturbed 
harmony. Although it might be interesting to discuss the way States have resolved such problems by negotiation, 
the fact that any results attained have come about through contextual bargaining make it difficult to use their 
results as basis for some customary rule or other.”) 
275  See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 6 (“Of particular 
significance is the fact that each state has the power of ‘auto-interpretation’ of legal rules, a power that necessarily 
follows from the absence of courts endowed with general and compulsory jurisdiction.”) 
276 See Anlei Zuo. Research on EU's Position and Strategy in the Implementation of DSB Rulings. Presentday 
Law Science 11.2 (2013): 104-118. (Arguing that EU implement DSB rulings in a disguised way with essentially 
perfunctory method, which reveals that the so-called quasi-judicial WTO DSB mechanism is a kind of 
rule-oriented process and power-oriented ending.) 
277 For example, see Orakhelashvili, Alexander. Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions: UK 
Practice. Goettingen J. Int'l L. 2 (2010): 823. 
278 See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 190, par. 375. (“Any ‘criterion’ that one might wish to 
invoke so as to support any particular norm as jus cogens would seem to infect that putative norm with all the 
uncertainties and vulnerabilities that relate to that criterion.”) See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005, p 204-205. Also see Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure 
of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 323-325. (“If it is the 
point of jus cogens to limit what may be lawfully agreed by States - can its content simultaneously be made 
dependent on what is agreed between States?”) 
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in a disguised way that is quite different from that of national laws. Many rules could be interpreted 
and implemented in such a manner as to defend some practices to be consistent with international legal 
obligations, even if it doesn’t seems to be so.279 It is not clear to determine which rule will be and will 
not be applied, and how is that rule will be interpreted and implemented. Namely, despite that the 
international normative network is already built up, the anticipated “implementation and enforcement 
machinery” of international law is still “in its infancy”,280 if it is likely to grow and mature. That 
makes it impossible to “flesh out and give teeth to the basic tenets destined to act as the backbone of 
the community”281. Consequently, a lot of substantive provisions in international law are not going to 
be implemented or observed in the same way as national laws and regulations, due to this absence of 
specific procedural provisions about legal interpretation and legal remedies.282 A varied, disguised way, 
or even a contradictory one, is sometimes happening simultaneously, spontaneously and implicitly in 
international law.283 That makes the ontological “ethos” of international legal system fully exposed. 
“This situation presents a remarkable oddity, which however is indicative of the still 
rudimentary development of international law: on the one hand, there exist fundamental 
principles which comprise the ‘international public order’, principles from which 
consequently States cannot derogate in their dealings; on the other hand it is only possible to 
rely upon these principles in relatively exceptional circumstances. Such principles thus 
remain essentially in a state of potentiality, rather than producing their legal effects on an 
everyday basis and in any direction.”284 
Then, why does international legal system continue to exist in such a peculiar manner? The answers are 
quite obvious and natural, which is that this world society is still decentralized and divided, with 
diffused authority and power as the “existential conditions”285. International law is accordingly 
                                                            
279 See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 206. 
280 See Delbruck, Jost. A More Effective International Law or a New “World Law”?--Some Aspects of the 
Development of International Law in a Changing International System. Ind. LJ 68 (1993): 705-1417. (“In some 
respects, international law is changing into the ‘internal law’ of a World Community. However, the still-defective 
system of international law enforcement and the still-persisting role of the paradigm of sovereignty suggest that it 
would be premature to speak of such a far-reaching change in the nature of international law”) 
281 See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 67. 
282 This has been a long-lasting problem for international law since the try of the League of Nations. See Cassese, 
Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 37. 
283 See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 64. 
284 See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 204. (The word in bold is 
originally highlighted in italics in the book.) 
285 See Chimni, Bhupinder S. The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach. 
Melb. J. Int'l L. 8 (2007): 499. Also see Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties. Leiden Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553-579. See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, 
and Gunther Teubner. Regime-collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. 
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developed to reflect and facilitate the operation and pursuit of various national interests and interests of 
the community, not the other way around.286 So, the “complexity and pluralism”287 in this world 
society requires international law to be as flexible and responsive as it could, so as to be effective and 
relevant to balance different interests, allocate decision-making authorities and ease potential conflicts 
in many subtle and intractable situations.288  
  Inevitably, compared to national legal systems, international law is in such a lack of so-called 
“coherence” and “unity” that its application, interpretation and implementation cannot be understood 
and comprehended as it is, as a result of dogmatic behavior.289 But this is how international law works 
and works quite well, as is analyzed here: it is applied, interpreted and implemented in own unique way 
so that the it can accomplish, maintain and enhance its role among international politics and 
international intercourses in a world society. In other words, the so-called “unity”, “predictability” and 
“legal security”, which are closely connected to the “unity/fragmentation” debate hereof, are 
comparatively less valued in international law, or couldn’t be valued too much in international law. By 
contrast, responsiveness to contexts and functionality of international regulation are more significant 
for the development and evolution of international law in this world society.290 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mich. J. Int'l L. 25 (2003): 999. 
286 Similar arguments could be found in See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p 204. (“History has shown that the will and the capacity of individual peoples to contribute to their 
world environment is constantly changing. It is only logical that the organizational forms (and what else are such 
things as borders and governments?) should change with them. The function of a system of international 
relationships is not to inhibit this process of change by imposing a legal straitjacket upon it but rather to facilitate it: 
to ease its transitions, to temper the temper the asperities to which it often leads, to isolate and moderate the 
conflicts to which it give rise, and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for international 
life in general.”) 
287 See Young, Margaret A. Toward a Legal Framework for Regime Interaction: Lessons from Fisheries, Trade, 
and Environmental Regimes. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 105 (2011): 107, 110. (“Yet they represent an effort to 
understand the progressive development of international law in the context of fragmentation and an attempt to 
improve the way fisheries governance adapts to complexity and pluralism.”) 
288 Kennan, George Frost. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, p 95. 
(“But this is a task for diplomacy, in the most old-fashioned sense of the term. For this, law is too abstract, too 
inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the unpredictable and the unexpected.”) Also see Lapidoth, Ruth, 
Tomer Broude, and Yuval Shany. The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering 
Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity; Essays in Honour of Professor Ruth Lapidoth. Oxford: Hart, 2008. 
(“International law is fragmented and complex, and at the same time increasingly capable of shaping reality in 
areas as diverse as human rights, trade and investment, and environmental law. The increased influences of 
international law and its growing institutionalization and judicialization invites reconsideration of the question how 
should the authority to make and interpret international law be allocated among states, international organizations 
and tribunals, or in other words, "who should decide what" in a system that formally lacks a central authority? This 
is not only a juridical question, but one that lies at the very heart of the political legitimacy of international law as a 
system of governance, defining the relationship between those who create the law and those who are governed by 
it in a globalizing world.”) 
289 See Popper, Karl R. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge, 
2002, p 64. 
290 As for responsiveness and functionality, see ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 248-249, par. 492-493. 
Also see Fitzpatrick, Peter. Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
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“A program of subordinating all variation of the ‘law in action’ to the uniformity of formal 
law is like a program of making all spoken language an exact replica of written language, 
but it does not invariably afford the best guidance about how to speak. We should be 
cautioned by the way that our tendency to visualize the ‘law in action’ as a deviant or 
debased version of the higher law, the ‘law on the books’, parallels folk beliefs about 
language usage.”291 
For example, there are 34 WTO disputes cases citing TRIPs Agreement in the request for consultations. 
(See APPDNEIX Ⅰ: A List of the 34 cases Citing TRIPs Agreement in the Request for Consultations) 
Although there are official DSB rulings and AB Reports, parties are free to choose and agree the means 
to implement those DSB rulings as long as it could satisfy the interests demands of both parties in 
reference to the covered WTO Agreement.292 “Mutually satisfactory solution” is the content of the 
“obligation of result” in WTO DSB mechanism, and other goals would be properly resolved through 
diplomatic means.293 Consequently, DSB rulings are always implemented in a disguised way with an 
essentially perfunctory method, which reveals that the so-called quasi-judicial WTO DSB mechanism 
is a kind of rule-oriented process and power-oriented ending.294  
  And it should be well noted that this thesis is not simply about pulling the understanding of modern 
international law back to the power-based, “national interest”-fueled realism, or any pattern like that.295 
Rather, it endeavors to “embrace a type of socio-legal realism-looking to the complex, dynamic and 
varied social processes that mold international law in practice”, as said by Levit, Janet Koven in 2007. 
None of those concepts of “institutional fragmentation”, “international legal pluralism” or “unity of 
international law” is something that is to be dogmatically affirmed or completely denied.296 Instead, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2001, p 4-6, 218. (Arguing about the compromise between certainty and responsiveness) 
291 Galanter, Marc. Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law. The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 13.19 (1981): 1-47, 5. Also see Ferguson, Charles A. Language Structure and 
Language Use; Essays. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1971, p 222-223. (“[W]riting almost never 
reflects speech in an exact way, written language frequently develops characteristics not found in the 
corresponding spoken language.”) 
292 See World Trade Organization. Dispute Settlement Reports 2009: Volume 9, Pages 3817-4282. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, p 3852. Also see Di Gianni, Fabrizio, and Renato Antonini. DSB Decisions 
and Direct Effect of WTO Law: Should the EC Courts be More Flexible when the Flexibility of the WTO System 
has Come to an End?. Journal of World Trade 40.4 (2006): 777-794. 
293 See Kennan, George Frost. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, p 
95. (“But this is a task for diplomacy, in the most old-fashioned sense of the term. For this, law is too abstract, too 
inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the unpredictable and the unexpected.”) 
294 See Anlei Zuo. Research on EU's Position and Strategy in the Implementation of DSB Rulings. Presentday 
Law Science 11.2 (2013): 104-118. 
295 There are already many criticisms for realism. For example, see Buchanan, Allen E. Justice, Legitimacy, and 
Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p 31-35. 
296 See Chimni, Bhupinder S. Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto. Int'l Comm. L. Rev. 8 
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they should be critically observed, analyzed, understood and explained.297 Different environments, 
backgrounds and aspirations produce the cherished diversification of this world. So does international 
law. It is not argued here that “existence is reasonable and should not be questioned and modified”, but 
that “what is actual is rational, and therefore a true understanding is the prerequisite for debate, the first 
step before judging”. 
“Today, a new generation of international legal scholars arrives at a juncture hauntingly 
similar to that which the New Haven School confronted in the 1950s, and those of us who 
might be considered part of a “new” New Haven School have responded in a like manner. 
We choose to refute power-based, “national interest”-fueled realism, not by conceding its 
underlying premises, but by challenging them. And like our New Haven School predecessors, 
we embrace a type of socio-legal realism-looking to the complex, dynamic and varied social 
processes that mold international law in practice. In asking questions that strike at the very 
nature of international law, we paint a more representative portrait that is at once colorful in 
its nuance and daunting in its complexity.”298 
Also, this thesis is not trying to question or get entangled into the issue of “the objectivity of 
international law”. 299  As has been elaborated by Professor Martti Koskenniemi long before, 
international legal system is determinate,300 as the application, interpretation and implementation 
processes in international legal system are totally other issues that are different from the objectivity of 
international legal rules and international legal system itself.301 Rather, it is simply pointed out here 
that the paradoxes and contradictions between international law’s effectiveness and validity reveal one 
more deep, profound and universal peculiarity of international legal system:302 the fault between legal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2006): 3, 21. (“However, the presence or absence of the third world, it is worth stressing, is not something that is 
either to be dogmatically affirmed or completely denied. It is not to be viewed as an either/or choice in all 
contexts.”) 
297 See Singleton, Royce, Bruce C. Straits, and Margaret Miller Straits. Approaches to Social Research. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993, p 20-21. 
298 See Levit, Janet Koven. Bottom-up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of 
International Law. Yale J. Int'l L. 32 (2007): 393, 419. (The response - a response indelibly marked by New Haven 
School jurisprudence - is to question the naysayers' foundational assumptions by turning from the detached, 
game-theoretic heights of power-based realism to the on-the-ground nuance and gradation of socio-legal realism.) 
299 See Schachter, Oscar. Invisible College of International Lawyers. Nw. UL Rev. 72 (1977): 217. Also see 
Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
300 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 32. Also see ICJ. South West Africa Case, Reports 1966, p 34. 
301 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 32. 
302 In regards to the relationship between effectiveness and validity in international law, see Kelsen, Hans. Pure 
Theory of Law. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, p 213-214. (Arguing that “effectiveness is a 
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texts and political realities in this world society. International law exists to serve a social need,303 and 
international law is an aspect of the broader political processes.304 It is argued by many scholars that 
international law is a contingent surface of a socially shared manner of envisaging international politics 
and relations.305 
  Secondly, on the level of the establishment, interaction and evolution of international regimes and 
legal rules, historically, pluralistically and functionally speaking, international (IP) law is accretive, 
accumulative and progressive.306 The so-called development, evolution, upgrading or updating of 
international (IP) law are different from the revocation and amendments of national laws, which are 
more swift, explicit and resounding.307 If one prior national law or regulation is replaced or amended 
by another subsequent national law, there would be clear official notification and announcement, 
including the commencement date, scope of application and other basic matters. However, since there 
is no overarching authority or legislature in international law, practices as well as effectiveness are the 
legitimate sources for the evolution of legal regimes and rules; 308 and also the legitimacy of 
international regimes and rules are more social viewed in this world society.309 Thus, the role of 
international regimes and the texts of international treaties are actually negotiated and finalized with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
condition for the validity—but it is not validity……If we replace the concept of reality (as effectiveness of the 
legal order) by the concept of power, then the problem of the relation between validity and effectiveness of the 
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might.”) Also see Kelsen, Hans. Principles of International Law. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1952, p 414. 
303 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 31. Also see Tamanaha, Brian Z. A General Jurisprudence of Law and 
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304 See Schachter, Oscar. International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law. 
Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses, 1982/V, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p 24. 
305 For example, see Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 11. 
306 “The current range of international legal obligations benefits from a process of accretion and accumulation.” 
Southern Bluefin Tuna case (Australia and New Zealand/Japan), Award of 4 August 2000 (Jurisdiction and 
admissibility), UNRIAA vol. XXIII (2004), p 40-41, par. 52. See ILC. Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion International Law. Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), p 220, 
par. 416. Also see Albrow, Martin. The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p 125. 
307 For example, see Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the 
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Eleventh National People’s Congress on February 26, 2010). Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198294. 
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Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?. American Journal of International Law 
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54 
reference to other parallel international regimes and legal arrangements pointing to different directions 
of balance of interests, especially in international IP law.310 Namely, “systematic thinking”311 of 
international law starts early from the law-making phase all the way to legal interpretation and 
implementation, as the ontological “ethos” is accepted as the “new normal” and basic elements of 
international law in this world society. Therefore, the formation of an international regime (or legal rule) 
is always pluralistically accumulative, historically accretive and evolutionarily progressive. 
  From a perspective of internalization of those above-mentioned dynamics under the broad setting of 
“world society”, that’s also why regime interaction, forum shifting, norm-setting competition, 
overlapping boundaries are common phenomena in international legal system. The accomplishment of 
an effective and legitimate international regime (or legal rule) takes a period of time, during which the 
process may go back and forth repeatedly, with overlapping and coexistence of “prior and subsequent” 
international regimes and legal rules therein.312 There are many parallel regimes and rules coexisting, 
as a result of the absence of clear rule for the abolishment of law. That’s why in this world society, the 
approach of “seeking relationship”313 and the perspective of social interaction and evolution are 
believed to be quite explanatory and insightful. And on the whole, all those international treaties, 
international legal documents and other research outputs produce a kind of “superimposed effect” to 
make international regimes and legal rules keep relevant and effective in their own way.314 
  Thirdly, comparatively and constructively from the perspective of the nature and legitimation of 
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Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1977. 
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international legal system, international law is realistic and conservative,315 or even labeled as 
primitive.316 That means that international law is quite reflective of international political realities and 
world visions.317 Consequently, power and social diversity of this “world society” could reveal one 
aspect of international law’s ontological “ethos” and inherent virtues.318 
  So, on the one hand, from the perspective of top-down approach of international legal studies, 
because of international law’s ontological “ethos” of being realistic, international law is considered to 
be multi-faceted, general and lose, even tainted with some ambiguity.319 There are so many various 
and conflicting national interest to accommodate, as well as community interests and values to uphold. 
On many occasions, it is not easy or even possible to provide justifiable solutions to normative 
problems, which come about in a legal determined way, independent from but closely related to 
political consideration.320 That leads to, firstly, the unity and coherence of international law as a legal 
system is nowhere near national legal systems since it needs to be responsive and reflective; secondly, 
international law’s role in international politics and international relations is still quite limited as a 
result of many structural factors.321 The “objectivity of international law” and the “relevance of 
international law”322 are confirmed, but the limited role of international law in this world society still 
needs further analysis and exploration.323 
“Addressing gaps between international legal systems is fundamental both to the legitimacy 
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319 See Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 64. 
320 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 24-25. 
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322 Gross, Leo, Karl W. Deutsch, and Stanley Hoffmann. The Relevance of International Law; Essays in Honor of 
Leo Gross. Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Pub. Co, 1968. 
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of international law in the twenty-first century and to ongoing efforts to use international law 
as a central component in global efforts to address climate change, one of the greatest social, 
economic and political problems of our age.”324 
Descriptively speaking, international law is divided and decentralized, with conceptual notions like 
“national legal systems” and “national sovereignties” as “background noise”325 in a world society. It is 
obvious that those concepts are constructed and are still being reconstructed every minute. So are other 
notions in the studies with top-down approach.326 So, if the theoretical premises are amended and 
partially denied, other alternative approaches could be used to analyze and theorize the “institutional 
fragmentation” phenomenon in consideration of the ontological “ethos” of international legal system. 
“The fragmentation of the international legal system into technical ‘regimes’, when 
examined from the point of view of the law of treaties, is not too different from its traditional 
fragmentation into more or less autonomous territorial regimes called ‘national legal 
systems’.”327 
On the other hand, from the perspective of bottom-up approach of international legal studies, 
international law has been developing and is still evolving in a bottom-up manner, but it has been 
constructed by so many top-down concepts on the level of theoretical scholarship.328 For example, the 
contradiction between the specialization of international law (the “functional approach” of modern 
international law’s development, as the endogenous factors) and top-down systematic theoretical 
conception of international law (international law as a legal system, as the exogenous factors), which is 
argued above, could be viewed totally from another perspective. It indicates that the specialization and 
expansion of international legal regulation, as the substance of this so-called “functional approach”, is 
about to achieve the goal of “the integration of the international community” in a bottom-up manner, 
with normative networking and relational structures, thus making the “top-down systematic conception 
of international law as a legal system” come into being. 
                                                            
324 Piñon Carlarne, Cinnamon. Good Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law 
Away?. Law & Policy 30.4 (2008): 450-480, 475. 
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“This gradual interpenetration and cross-fertilization of previously somewhat 
compartmentalized areas of international law is a significant development: it shows that at 
least at the normative level the international community is becoming more integrated…”329 
In a sense, the “ethos” of international law reflects the combination and the confluence of normativism 
and functionalism: on the one hand, international law could be used to delimit and leverage 
international politics; on the other hand, international law is still a significant tool for the contention of 
international political interests. Normative commitments of research methods do not imply that the 
political nature of the research object should be denied or ignored, and the strengthening of several 
analytical frameworks could arrive at a better conclusion with better explanatory power. 
  So, specifically to the topic of “institutional fragmentation of international IP law” here in the thesis, 
the ontological “ethos” of international law can be rendered or externally presented in the following 
aspects. 
  Firstly, diversity and pluralism are the existential conditions of international law as a legal system in 
this world society, which is and should be embedded into the very nature of international law and its 
further progressive development. 330  That requires international law to be more responsive and 
functional to the realities of this world society, which makes the ontological ethos of international law, 
whether in the form of debates on “relevance of international law”331, “objectivity of international 
law”332, “the unity of international law”333 or the “institutional fragmentation of international law”334 
hereof, are definitely, inevitably and naturally different from that of national legal systems. 
Consequently, the coherence and unity are less valued and are not going to be valued in the same way 
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as in national legal systems.335 This is international law, as it is, always and always will be.  
  In other words, that kind of unity and thereby anticipated certainty and predictability is not suitable 
or anticipated in international law. That’s because the kind of “certainty” or ethos that international 
really needs under this world society is the certainty that the supremacy and sanctity of national 
sovereignty enables all countries have the right to flexibly act on the basis of their national interests or 
will of states unless the country has a clear commitment in international law.336 And in a sense, that’s 
also why those provisions in international treaties that are compromises of contracting parties, 
particularly those contentious and national-interest-related parts, tends to be quite vague and obscure, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, contracting parties are reluctant to apply them.337 Those 
ambiguous legal provisions and texts realize the above-mentioned and states-anticipated certainty and 
predictability of law all the better, and it is the same thing for the reluctance to apply some provisions 
since taking risks to set precedents that could be potentially disadvantageous is inconformity with the 
cost-benefit analysis. 
  Secondly, within international legal system, against this decentralized, fragmented and realistic 
backdrop of world society, clashes of forces are presented as regime interactions, competition and 
evolutions, in an institutional sense.338 All those make international law seem to be fragmented, from 
the stage of international law-making to its application, interpretation and implementation. But that’s 
just how international law works and survives in this world society. Analogy between international 
legal system and national legal systems cannot be untenable, and the concept of “institutional 
fragmentation” is vacuous and of low explanatory power to the phenomena of international legal 
practices.339 
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  Thirdly, pluralism and complexity reflects the complex interest appeals in this world society, which 
would be transmitted to decentralized international law-making, regime interaction and enforcement 
machinery for the lack of overarching authority and legislature, as well as implementation and 
enforcement machinery.340 So, within international legal system, against this decentralized, fragmented 
and realistic backdrop of world society, international law is case-based applied, auto-interpreted and 
disguised implemented. Those benefits of the so-called “institutional fragmentation”, making 
international law being effective and relevant, are understated and misinterpreted. 
  Fourthly, bottom-up approach can be more explanatory and effective in the analyses of regime 
interaction and evolution, as it is more ontological and inside-out-looking. The pivotal role of 
international law and the “contemporarily limited but ever-increasing gravity” of international law in 
international legal governance and regulation enable the networking of international law. But the 
top-down conception of international law as a legal system should always be relevant with real bases 
and realistic requests, rather than the “augmented realities”341. That’s why bottom-up approach is 
increasingly emphasized and relied, taking account of the ontological “ethos” of international legal 
system to explore those accurate dynamics of international practices and evolutionary processes.342 
“It would appear that there exists no sense of a universal and abstract normativity. Rather, it 
seems that we (continue to) live in a world of legal islands, formed by states, international 
organizations and at best regimes, in which every interested legal actors has to struggle to 
attain its advantage. Furthermore, in what has been one of the more powerful waves of 
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interdependence, the globalization and global governance project after the end of the Cold 
War, it is as yet as difficult to recognize Kelsen’s vision for a civitas maxima.”343 
  All those make it particularly necessary to implant this “ontological ethos” approach for a better 
understanding of international law’s fundamentals and evolution in a world society.344 
 
2.4.2. The Rhetoric of “Institutional Fragmentation” 
Then, why does this debate on the institutional fragmentation arise in the first place, and why could this 
language of institutional fragmentation become such a heated issue and topic in the academic studies of 
international law?345 This is a question about the politics of the “institutional fragmentation” language 
in international law and a question about the implication of this “institutional fragmentation” rhetoric in 
international law. 
  On the one hand, it is claimed that international law is transformed from its original nature and 
foundations, or at least conceptual “cognitive prepossessions”346, by the forces of globalization. And it 
is intrinsically related to the concerns over the legitimacy of international law as a legal system.  
“The last decade of the twentieth century and the first of the twenty-first century will 
certainly rank high as a challenging period for the generally accepted assumptions of 
international law. The forces of ‘globalization’, accompanied by striking changes in 
government institutions, a remarkable increase in NGO activity and advocacy, an intense 
emphasis on market economic ideas and a backlash against them, have chipped away at the 
fragile theoretical foundations of the international legal system as it has been generally 
accepted for centuries.”347 
On the other hand, this “institutional fragmentation” debate is considered as just a fantastic illusion, 
since there are no fundamental or essential changes in the basic texture and structure of international 
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legal regulation, international governance and international law, while some hidden features and 
peculiarities of international law gradually manifest themselves under new circumstances of this world 
society. 
“On the other hand, the lament of the lack of integrity of contemporary international law is 
seen by some as the anxiety of traditional international lawyers who cannot come to terms 
with a world that has dramatically changed. Fragmentation, in this view, simply has to be 
lived with and reforms sought in separate functional spaces. Fragmentation is merely the 
existential condition of international law in a postmodern world.”348 
It is pointless to merely attach some labels or rhetoric concepts to the phenomena in international law 
and this world society, whether it is “unity/fragmentation” debate or the “proliferation/pluralism” 
argument, or even this “ontological ethos” approach, unless it could be helpful to explain and analyze 
the underlying driving forces, factors and rules, and attach clarity to the problems.349 If not, then those 
concepts and arguments are nothing but rhetoric for unjustified and ungrounded preferences, 
assumptions or cognitive biases concerning international legal studies and this world society, which are 
confusing and puzzling both methodologically and analytically. Just like Prost, Mario said in 2012: 
“The expansion, specialization and increased complexity of international law have promoted 
new territorial battles in which different classes of lawyers compete to gain control over 
contested areas of work and specialization. Central to these territorial battles are what 
Bourdieu calls ‘classification struggles’ (lutes de classement), that is, cognitive quarrels 
between different groups of social agents (‘ancient’ versus ‘moderns’, ‘generalists’ versus 
‘specialists’, ‘old cadres’ versus ‘new technocrats’) regarding the legitimate definition of the 
social space and of their role within it. In this context, one quickly comes to realize, 
‘fragmentation’ often constitutes a rhetorical device used by generalist/public international 
lawyers as an instrument of symbolic legitimization in their ongoing struggle for professional 
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recognition and dominance.”350 
On a deeper level of international legal system’s fundamentals and theories, the fundamental 
contradiction contained in this “institutional fragmentation of international law” debate is between the 
specialization of international law (the “functional approach” of modern international law’s 
development, as the endogenous factors) and top-down systematic theoretical conception of 
international law (international law as a legal system, as the exogenous factors). And the junction of 
those forces is the “concerns on the legitimacy of international law” in a world society, which is 
manifested outwards as the question “to what extent is there, or should there be, some kind of ‘unity’ in 
international law”351. This issue of institutional fragmentation is of universal nature in international 
legal studies, as it evolves the basic properties, ontological ethos, operational characteristics, inherent 
contradictions and mode of existence of international law as a legal system, under a world society. 
  As once insightfully pointed out by Martti Koskenniemi, from the perspective of structural 
linguistics, the meaning of a concept in a discursive topic is established by “a network of binary 
oppositions between it and all the other surrounding expressions in the underlying language”352, 
particularly the opposite concept. 353  Only by that can we, firstly thoroughly understand the 
connotations of a legal phrase/terminology, and secondly think and argue beyond those conceptual 
boxes and constrains. Particularly here in this thesis, the debate on the institutional fragmentation of 
international law is actually about the ontological ethos and underlying characteristics—principally the 
“unity”—of international law in this world society. Therefore, we should internalize this issue by 
making it tangible opportunity and visible entry point for a better understanding and construction of 
international law as a unique and distinct legal system. Any issue of universal nature could be raised on 
a certain level from the perspective of endogenous factors and ontological ethos, rather than merely in a 
way of exogenous factors and forces. What's more, those endogenous driving forces are of a more 
fundamental nature, while exogenous factors and external effects also play a part by being transmitted 
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and transformed to the endogenous ones.354 And those endogenous and exogenous perspectives can be 
integrated for better analyses and elaborations. 
  Specifically speaking, the argumentation highlights to deconstruct this rhetoric of “institutional 
fragmentation” of international law in this thesis are as follows:  
  (1) In the “institutional fragmentation of international IP law” debate, the analogy between 
international law and national legal systems, as the theoretical premise of the “institutional 
fragmentation” language, fails for the lack of “relevant similarity”.  
  (2) The ontological “ethos” of international (IP) law, which are the inherent virtues of international 
law-making and implementation, regime evolution and interaction in this world society, could rectify 
the chaos of this rhetoric of “institutional fragmentation” and illuminate the understated benefits as 
well as rationalities of institutional fragmentation. The “post-ontological era” is not coming yet for this 
“institutional fragmentation” debate, and the “institutional fragmentation” is the “new normal”. 
  (3) The fundamental contradiction contained in this “institutional fragmentation of international law” 
debate is between the specialization of international law (the “functional approach” of modern 
international law’s development, as the endogenous factors) and top-down systematic theoretical 
conception of international law (international law as a legal system, as the exogenous factors). The 
junction of those forces is the “concerns on the legitimacy of international law” against national legal 
systems in a world society.  
  (4) From analogical reasoning to ontological “ethos”, there is a “paradigm shift” from the traditional 
“top-down” global governance paradigm (which is associated with analogical reasoning and 
hierarchical solutions to “regime complex”) to a “bottom-up” approach with more ontological and 
inside-out-looking (which could better grasp and understand the dynamics and pulse of regime 
interaction and evolution). This fundamental change enables those arguments thereafter on the regime 
interactions and evolutions have totally different theoretical departures, journeys and destinations. 
Namely, it is more appropriate to ask “what is the status quo, and how to understand it in a historical, 
relational, structural and holographic way; through analyses of underlying reasons and rules, how will 
the landscape develop in the future and what could or should be done if there are certain preferences” 
with a realistic “bottom-up approach” in consideration of the “law of universal gravitation” and the 
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structure of “tensional integrity” in this “regime interaction” perspective, rather than constructively and 
blindly ask “how to better manage the existing regimes and their collisions, and what are those 
workable (hierarchical or top-down-governance) solutions” from the perspective of “top-down” 
governance with cognitive path-dependence. 
  Time has been witnessing that these huge gaps among academic research, legal texts and 
international legal practices, as well as “huge gap between normative level and implementation” in 
international law,355 have caused a lot of confusions and chaos with respects to legal rhetoric and 
interpretation. And this debate of “institutional fragmentation”, as “a powerful and defining metaphor 
of modern international law scholarship,”356 is one of those.357 More importantly, “[W]hat all of the 
above demonstrates is that the interest in issues of fragmentation has not faded away. Fragmentation, it 
seems, is here to stay.”358 
“[B]etween theory and practice in politics, not always easy to trace because the actors 
themselves may easily be unconscious of their theoretical prepossessions which, nevertheless, 
powerfully influence their whole attitude towards practical affairs; and at no time has it been 
so important, as it is today, that we should see the facts of international life as they really are, 
and not as they come to us reflected in false or outworn theories.”359 
All in all, international law, as a legal system under this decentralized, fragmented and divided world 
society, which is more significant and palpable than any other superficial rhetorics and seemingly 
satisfying theories, should be examined and surveyed as it is.  
 
2.4.3. A Comeback: the Benefits and Rationalities of “Institutional Fragmentation”  
One last issue that this chapter should expound is the benefits and rationalities of the “institutional 
fragmentation” phenomenon, since this thesis has been claiming that the benefit and rationalities of the 
institutional fragmentation have been understated from the beginning of our arguments, as the 
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which are often conflated in academic and political dialogue, and encourages commentators to more carefully 
consider how the terms of law, governance, and “good systems” of law and governance are being used.”) 
358 Prost, Mario. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Pub, 2012, p 12. 
359 See Brierly, J. L. The Basis of Obligation in International Law, and Other Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1958, p 1-2. 
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institutional fragmentation is the “new normal” in this world society and the post-ontological era has 
not come yet for this “institutional fragmentation” debate. Those benefits and rationalities could be 
summarized as follows. 
  Firstly, the so-called “institutional fragmentation” achieves the market-oriented competition and 
allocation of international regimes and institutions, thus ensuring that the international law-making and 
norm-setting could be experimented and developed on multi-level platforms, as well as refraining from 
monopoly of one single regime or some particularly designed institutions.  
  Secondly, the so-called “institutional fragmentation” endows the subjects of international law 
(particularly the States) with more options and bargain chips in the negotiations and conclusion of 
international legal documents, therefore containing the potential role of dogmatism and the happening 
of deadlocks, and ultimately facilitating the efficient functioning of international cooperation.  
  Thirdly, the so-called “institutional fragmentation” requires that those international legal practices, 
including but not limited to the application, interpretation and implementation of international law, 
should pay more attention to the legitimacy of the regime/institution as an authority in this world 
society, as well as should be more closely and tightly linked to the latest dynamics and landscapes of 
this world society, thus in a way making progress in the promotion of democratic governance on the 
international level. 
  As Professor Martti Koskenniemi once said, “the choice of one among several applicable legal 
regimes refers back to what is understood as significant in a problem. And the question of significance 
refers back to what the relevant institution understands as its mission, its structural bias.”360 That’s 
about the initial institutional design, the gravity and relevance of different regimes, under the 
background of different interest demands and diverse gravity of international regime(s) to certain 
subject of international law in international politics and international relations. Normative conflicts and 
institutional proliferations are not necessarily negative things as long as it survives the cost-benefit 
analysis of so many subjects of international law.  
  
                                                            
360 Koskenniemi, Martti. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern Law 
Review 70.1 (2007): 1-30, 6. 
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2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As Berman, Paul Schiff said in his 2012 book:  
“We live in a world of legal pluralism, where a single act or actor is potentially regulated by 
multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes imposed by state, substate, transnational, supranational, 
and nonstate communities. Navigating these spheres of complex overlapping legal authority 
is confusing, and we cannot expect territorial borders to solve all these problems because 
human activity and legal norms inevitably flow across such borders. At the same time, those 
hoping to create one universal set of legal rules are also likely to be disappointed by the 
sheer variety of human communities and interests. Instead, we need an alternative 
jurisprudence, one that seeks to create or preserve spaces for productive interaction among 
multiple, overlapping legal systems by developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and 
practices that aim to manage, without eliminating, the legal pluralism we see around us. 
Such mechanisms, institutions, and practices can help mediate conflicts, and we may find 
that the added norms, viewpoints, and participants produce better decision making, better 
adherence to those decisions by participants and non-participants alike, and ultimately better 
real-world outcomes.”361 
From those narratives, researches and theoretical debates above, it is clear that this is a good 
opportunity to theorize and internalize the “institutional fragmentation” debate into the ontological 
“ethos” of international law, with “a reconceptualization of both the functions and the effectiveness of 
traditional international law and institutions”362 so as to better understand international law as a legal 
system in a world society. It is obvious that this rhetoric of “institutional fragmentation” could be an 
excellent pointcut to realize the “paradigm shift” and get rid of the “approach dependence” in 
international legal studies. Moreover, this ontological “ethos” of international law guarantees a 
high-definition display of international IP regime interactions and evolution, which is theoretically 
explanatory, conceptually realistic and functionally effective for this so-called “post-ontological” and 
“post-Westphalia” topic.363  
                                                            
361 See Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders. Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, p i. 
362 See Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A Liberal Theory of International Law. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 94 (2000): 240, 
242. 
363 “Instead of bemoaning either the ‘fragmentation’ of law or the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should 
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“Overall, international lawyers can ill afford to ignore the growing wealth of political 
science data on the world they seek to regulate. The measurements may be imprecise, the 
theories crude, but the while offers at least the hope of a positive science of world affairs.”364 
More importantly, on the level of research methods and the logic of arguments, it is far from reasonable 
or acceptable to enter into certain “controlling assumptions”365 before we precisely approach and 
investigate an international legal problem. Those assumptions, premises and prerequisites must be 
disentangled and explicated against the “present character of social life among States”366, so as to be 
justified.367 
  Please allow me to quote the following words by Popper, Karl R again to end the exploration of this 
chapter. 
“Our propensity to look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature, leads to the 
psychological phenomenon of dogmatic thinking or, more generally, dogmatic behavior: we 
expect regularities everywhere and attempt to find them even where there are none; events 
which do not yield to these attempts we are inclined to treat as a kind of ‘background noise’; 
and we stick to our expectations even when they are inadequate and we ought to accept 
defeat.”368 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
accept them as a necessary consequence of the fact that communities cannot be hermetically sealed off from each 
other. Moreover, we can go further and consider the possibility that this jurisdictional messiness might, in the end, 
provide important systemic benefits by fostering dialogue among multiple constituencies, authorities, levels of 
government, and non-state communities. In addition, jurisdictional redundancy allows alternative ports of entry for 
strategic actors who might otherwise be silenced.” Berman, Paul Schiff. Federalism and International Law through 
the Lens of Legal Pluralism. Missouri Law Review, 2008, Vol. 73, 1183. 
364 Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter. International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda. Am. J. 
Int'l L. 87 (1993): 205, 239. 
365 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 3-4. 
366 See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 4. 
367 “What these positions are, which intellectual operations lead into then, and what it is that one needs to assume 
in order to believe that such positions and operations are justified.” See Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to 
Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 7. 
368 See Popper, Karl R. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge, 
2002, p 64. 
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APPDNEIX Ⅰ:  
A List of the 34 Cases Citing TRIPs Agreement in the Request for Consultations 
Case 
No. 
Case Name Basic Status Implementation Status 
DS467 Australia — Certain 
Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications 
and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging 
(Complainant: Indonesia) 
Consultations 
requested: 20 
September 2013; 
Current status: Panel 
composed; 
—— 
DS458 Australia — Certain 
Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications 
and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging 
(Complainant: Cuba) 
Consultations 
requested: 3 May 
2013; 
Current status: Panel 
composed; 
—— 
DS441 Australia — Certain 
Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications 
and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco 
Consultations 
requested: 18 July 
2012; Current status: 
Panel composed; 
—— 
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Products and Packaging 
(Complainant: Dominican 
Republic)  
DS435 Australia — Certain 
Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications 
and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging 
(Complainant: Honduras) 
Consultations 
requested: 4 April 
2012; Current status: 
Panel composed; 
—— 
DS434 Australia — Certain 
Measures Concerning 
Trademarks and Other 
Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable 
to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging (Complainant: 
Ukraine) 
Consultations 
requested: 13 March 
2012; Current status: 
Panel composed; 
—— 
DS409 European Union and a 
Member State — Seizure 
of Generic Drugs in 
Transit (Complainant: 
Brazil) 
Consultations 
requested: 12 May 
2010; Current status: 
In consultations; 
—— 
DS408 European Union and a 
Member State — Seizure 
of Generic Drugs in 
Transit (Complainant: 
Consultations 
requested: 11 May 
2010; Current status: 
In consultations; 
—— 
70 
India) 
DS372 China — Measures 
Affecting Financial 
Information Services and 
Foreign Financial 
Information Suppliers 
(Complainant: European 
Communities) 
Consultations 
requested: 3 March 
2008; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution); 
On 4 December 2008, China and the 
European Communities informed the 
DSB that they had reached an 
agreement in relation to this dispute in 
the form of a Memorandum of 
Understanding.369 
DS362 China — Measures 
Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 10 April 
2007; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by 
respondent; 
On 8 April 2010, China and the United 
States notified the DSB of Agreed 
Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of 
the DSU.370 
DS290 European Communities 
— Protection of 
Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications 
for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs 
(Complainant: Australia) 
Consultations 
requested: 17 April 
2003; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by 
respondent; 
At the DSB meeting on 21 April 2006, 
the European Communities said that 
they had fully implemented the DSB’s 
recommendations and rulings by 
adopting a new regulation which 
entered into force on 31 March 2006. 
Australia and the United States 
disagreed that the European 
Communities had fully implemented 
the DSB’s recommendations and 
rulings and invited the European 
Communities to take account of their 
                                                            
369 See WTO. China - Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information 
Suppliers - Joint Communication from China and the European Communities. WT/DS372/4, S/L/319/Add.1. 
IP/D/27/Add.1, 9 December 2008. 
370 See WTO. China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights - 
Understanding between China and the United States Regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU. 
WT/DS362/15, 13 April 2010. 
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comments and revise the newly 
promulgated regulation.371 
DS224 United States — US 
Patents Code 
(Complainant: Brazil) 
Consultations 
requested: 31 January 
2001; Current status: 
In consultations; 
—— 
DS199 Brazil — Measures 
Affecting Patent 
Protection (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 30 May 
2000; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution); 
On 5 July 2001, the parties to the 
dispute notified to the DSB a mutually 
satisfactory solution on the matter.372 
DS196 Argentina — Certain 
Measures on the 
Protection of Patents and 
Test Data (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 30 May 
2000; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution); 
On 31 May 2002, the US and 
Argentina notified the DSB that they 
have reached an agreement on all of the 
matters raised by the US in its requests 
for consultations regarding this dispute 
and that concerning Argentina — 
Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals 
and Test Data Protection for 
Agricultural Chemicals 
(WT/DS171).373 
                                                            
371 See WTO. European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs - Status Report by the European Communities – Addendum. WT/DS174/25/Add.3, 
WT/DS290/23/Add.3, 11 April 2006.  
372  See WTO. Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection - Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution. 
WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1, 19 July 2001. (“Should the U.S. withdraw the WTO panel against Brazil 
concerning the interpretation of Article 68, the Brazilian Government would agree, in the event it deems necessary 
to apply Article 68 to grant compulsory license on patents held by the U.S. companies, to hold prior talks on the 
matter with the U.S. Government. These talks would be held within the scope of the U.S. – Brazil Consultative 
Mechanism, in a special session scheduled to discuss the subject.” ) 
373 See WTO. Argentina - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural 
Chemicals (WT/DS171) - Argentina - Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, Notification of 
Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement. WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4, 
IP/D/18/Add.1, IP/D/22/Add.1, 20 June 2002. (“Following the rounds of consultations held on 15 June 1999, 27 
July 1999, 17 July 2000, 29 November 2000, 2 April 2001, 13 July 2001, 21 September 2001, 5 November 2001, 
and 14 April 2002, the United States and Argentina have reached a mutually satisfactory solution on the matters 
indicated in items 1 through 8(a). The mutually satisfactory solution on the matters indicated in items 4, 5 and 6 of 
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DS186 United States — Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930 and Amendments 
thereto (Complainant: 
European Communities) 
Consultations 
requested: 12 January 
2000; Current status: 
In consultations; 
—— 
DS176 United States — Section 
211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 
1998 (Complainant: 
European Communities) 
Consultations 
requested: 8 July 
1999; Current status: 
Report(s) adopted, 
with recommendation 
to bring measure(s) 
into conformity; 
At the expiry of the fourth extension of 
the reasonable period of time on 30 
June 2005, the European Communities 
and the United States notified the DSB 
of their Understanding whereby the 
European Communities agreed not to 
request, at this stage, authorization 
from the DSB to suspend concessions 
or other obligations pursuant to Article 
22.2 of the DSU.  However, it 
retained its right to request 
authorization from the DSB to suspend 
concessions or other obligations, giving 
the United States advance notice. In 
exchange, the United States agreed not 
to block the European Communities' 
request for DSB authorization on the 
grounds that such DSB action would 
not be within the time period set out in 
the first sentence of Article 22.6 of the 
DSU. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the attached text is subject to the passage by the Argentine National Congress of the bills referred to in those items 
within one year of the date of the submission of this notification. The matters indicated in items 8(b) and 9 shall be 
subject to the conditions set forth in the respective paragraphs of this notification. This agreement is without 
prejudice to the rights and obligations of Argentina and the United States under the WTO agreements.”) 
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Following the notification of the 
Understanding between the parties, the 
United States has been providing status 
reports on its progress in the 
implementation of the DSB 
recommendations in this matter in 
accordance with Article 21.6 of the 
DSU. 
DS174 European Communities 
— Protection of 
Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications 
for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs 
(Complainant: United 
States) 
Consultations 
requested: 1 June 
1999; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by 
respondent; 
At the DSB meeting on 21 April 2006, 
the European Communities said that 
they had fully implemented the DSB’s 
recommendations and rulings by 
adopting a new regulation which 
entered into force on 31 March 2006. 
Australia and the United States 
disagreed that the European 
Communities had fully implemented 
the DSB’s recommendations and 
rulings and invited the European 
Communities to take account of their 
comments and revise the newly 
promulgated regulation.374 
DS171 Argentina — Patent 
Protection for 
Pharmaceuticals and Test 
Data Protection for 
Agricultural Chemicals 
Consultations 
requested: 6 May 
1999; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
On 31 May 2002, the US and 
Argentina notified the DSB that they 
have reached an agreement on all of the 
matters raised by the US in its requests 
for consultations regarding this dispute 
                                                            
374 See WTO. European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs - Status Report by the European Communities – Addendum. WT/DS174/25/Add.3, 
WT/DS290/23/Add.3, 11 April 2006. 
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(Complainant: United 
States) 
agreed solution); and that concerning Argentina — 
Certain Measures on the Protection of 
Patents and Test Data (WT/DS196).375 
DS170 Canada — Term of 
Patent Protection 
(Complainant: United 
States)  
Consultations 
requested: 6 May 
1999; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by 
respondent; 
At the DSB meeting of 24 July 2001, 
Canada informed the DSB that it had 
fully complied with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings.  On 12 
July 2001, Bill S-17 had come into 
force.  This legislation brought 
Canada's Patent Act into conformity 
with its obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement.376 
DS160 United States — Section 
110(5) of US Copyright 
Act (Complainant: 
European Communities) 
Consultations 
requested: 26 January 
1999; Current status: 
Authorization to 
retaliate requested 
(including 22.6 
arbitration); 
On 23 June 2003, the United States and 
the European Communities informed 
the DSB of a mutually satisfactory 
temporary arrangement. Such 
temporary arrangement covered the 
period through to 20 December 2004.  
The United States has thereafter 
presented status reports to the DSB 
informing that the US Administration 
will work closely with the US 
Congress and will continue to confer 
with the European Union in order to 
reach a mutually satisfactory resolution 
of this matter.377 
                                                            
375 See WTO. Argentina - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural 
Chemicals (WT/DS171) - Argentina - Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, Notification of 
Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement. WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4, 
IP/D/18/Add.1, IP/D/22/Add.1, 20 June 2002. 
376  See WTO. Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS170, Canada — Term of Patent Protection. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds170_e.htm. 
377 See WTO. United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act - Status report by the United States – 
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DS153 European Communities 
— Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products (Complainant: 
Canada) 
Consultations 
requested: 2 
December 1998; 
Current status: In 
consultations; 
—— 
DS125 Greece — Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property 
Rights for Motion 
Pictures and Television 
Programs (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 4 May 
1998; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution); 
On 20 March 2001, the parties to the 
dispute notified a mutually satisfactory 
solution on the matter to the DSB.378 
DS124 European Communities 
— Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights for Motion 
Pictures and Television 
Programs (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 30 April 
1998; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution); 
On 20 March 2001, the parties to the 
dispute notified a mutually satisfactory 
solution on the matter to the DSB.379 
DS115 European Communities 
— Measures Affecting 
the Grant of Copyright 
and Neighbouring Rights 
(Complainant: United 
States) 
Consultations 
requested: 6 January 
1998; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution); 
On 6 November 2000, the parties 
notified the DSB that they had reached 
a mutually satisfactory solution.380 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Addendum. WT/DS160/24/Add.119, 5 December 2014. 
378 See WTO. Greece - Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs - 
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution. WT/DS125/2, IP/D/14/Add.1, 26 March 2001. 
379 See WTO. European Communities - Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and 
Television Programs - Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution. WT/DS124/2, IP/D/13/Add.1, 26 March 2001. 
380 See WTO. Ireland - Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (WT/DS82) - 
European Communities - Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (WT/DS115). 
WT/DS82/3, WT/DS115/3, IP/D/8/Add.1, IP/D/12/Add.1, 13 September 2002. 
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DS114 Canada — Patent 
Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products 
(Complainant: European 
Communities) 
Consultations 
requested: 19 
December 1997; 
Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by 
respondent; 
At the DSB meeting of 23 October 
2000, Canada informed Members that, 
effective from 7 October 2000, it had 
implemented the DSB’s 
recommendations.381 
DS86 Sweden — Measures 
Affecting the 
Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 28 May 
1997; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
In a communication dated 2 December 
1998, the two parties notified a 
mutually agreed solution to this 
dispute.382 
DS83 Denmark — Measures 
Affecting the 
Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 14 May 
1997; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
On 7 June 2001, the parties to the 
dispute notified to the DSB a mutually 
satisfactory solution on the matter.383 
DS82 Ireland — Measures 
Affecting the Grant of 
Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights 
(Complainant: United 
States) 
Consultations 
requested: 14 May 
1997; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
On 6 November 2000, the parties 
informed the DSB that they had 
reached a mutually satisfactory 
solution.384 
                                                            
381 See WTO. Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS114, Canada — Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products. 
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds114_e.htm 
382 See WTO. Sweden - Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights - Notification of 
Mutually-Agreed Solution. WT/DS86/2, IP/D/10/Add.1, 11 December 1998. 
383 See WTO. Denmark - Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights - Notification of 
Mutually Agreed Solution. WT/DS83/2, IP/D/9/Add.1, 13 June 2001. 
384 See WTO. Ireland - Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (WT/DS82) - 
European Communities - Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (WT/DS115). 
WT/DS82/3, WT/DS115/3, IP/D/8/Add.1, IP/D/12/Add.1, 13 September 2002. 
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DS79 India — Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products (Complainant: 
European Communities) 
Consultations 
requested: 28 April 
1997; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by respondent 
At the DSB meeting on 28 April 1999, 
India presented its final status report on 
implementation of DS50, which also 
applies to implementation in this 
dispute. The report disclosed the 
enactment of the relevant legislation to 
implement the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB.385 
DS59 Indonesia — Certain 
Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry 
(Complainant: United 
States) 
Consultations 
requested: 8 October 
1996; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by respondent 
By a communication dated 15 July 
1999, Indonesia informed the DSB that 
it had issued a new automotive policy 
on 24 June 1999 (the 1999 Automotive 
Policy), which effectively implemented 
the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB in this matter.386 
DS50 India — Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 2 July 
1996; Current status: 
Implementation 
notified by respondent 
At the DSB meeting on 28 April 1999, 
India presented its final status report on 
implementation of this matter which 
disclosed the enactment of the relevant 
legislation to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB.387 
DS42 Japan — Measures 
concerning Sound 
Recordings 
Consultations 
requested: 28 May 
1996; Current status: 
On 7 November 1997, both parties 
notified a mutually agreed solution.388 
                                                            
385 See WTO. India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products - Status Report by 
India – Addendum. WT/DS50/10/Add.4, WT/DS79/6, 16 April 1999. 
386 See WTO. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry - Status Report by Indonesia – 
Addendum. WT/DS54/17/Add.1, WT/DS55/16/Add.1, WT/DS59/15/Add.1, WT/DS64/14/Add.1 15 July 1999. 
387 See WTO. India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products - Status Report by 
India – Addendum. WT/DS50/10/Add.4, WT/DS79/6, 16 April 1999. 
388 See WTO. Japan - Measures Concerning Sound Recordings - Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution. 
WT/DS42/4, IP/D/4/Add.1, 17 November 1997. 
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(Complainant: European 
Communities) 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
DS37 Portugal — Patent 
Protection under the 
Industrial Property Act 
(Complainant: United 
States) 
Consultations 
requested: 30 April 
1996; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
On 3 October 1996, both parties 
notified a mutually agreed solution to 
the DSB.389 
DS36 Pakistan — Patent 
Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products (Complainant: 
United States) 
Consultations 
requested: 30 April 
1996; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
At the DSB meeting on 25 February 
1997, both parties informed the DSB 
that they had reached a mutually 
agreed solution to the dispute and that 
the terms of the agreement were being 
drawn up, and would be communicated 
to the DSB once finalized. On 28 
February 1997, the terms of the 
agreement were communicated to the 
Secretariat.390 
DS28 Japan — Measures 
Concerning Sound 
Recordings 
(Complainant: United 
States) 
Consultations 
requested: 9 February 
1996; Current status: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) 
On 24 January 1997, both parties 
informed the DSB that they had 
reached a mutually satisfactory 
solution to the dispute.391 
 
                                                            
389 See WTO. Portugal - Patent Protection under the Industrial Property Act - Notification of a Mutually-Agreed 
Solution. WT/DS37/2, IP/D/3/Add.1, 8 October 1996. 
390 See WTO. Pakistan - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products - Notification 
of a Mutually-Agreed Solution. WT/DS36/4, IP/D/2/Add.1, 7 March 1997. 
391 See WTO. Japan - Measures Concerning Sound Recordings - Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution. 
WT/DS28/41, IP/D/1/Add.1, 5 February 1997. 
